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The provisions of the Bankruptcy Act applicable to partner-
ships, partners, and their creditors were cryptic. Significant
changes in these provisions made by the Bankruptcy Reform Act
of 1978 have not appreciably diminished the difficulties of ad-
ministering the estates of partnerships and partners in cases under
Title 11 of the United States Code. The rules governing discharge
of partnerships and partners and the dischargeability of their
debts have given rise to a number of special problems under both
the Bankruptcy Act and the Bankruptcy Reform Act. This Article
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undertakes to identify and analyze these problems and to suggest
solutions.
I. DISCHARGE OF A PARTNERSHIP
Under the Bankruptcy Act' a partnership could be discharged
in a straight bankruptcy case or in a Chapter XI or Chapter XII
debtor relief case under the same circumstances as an individual
could be discharged.2 Since bankruptcy of a partnership results in
dissolution,' and because discharge of the firm, at least ordinarily,
does not affect the liability of the partners,4 discharge of the part-
nership in a liquidation case under the Bankruptcy Act was incon-
sequential. The Bankruptcy Code authorizes a grant of discharge
in a liquidation proceeding only to an individual,5 but this change
in the law can be characterized as insignificant.6
1. Act of July 1, 1898, ch. 541, 30 Stat. 544, amended by Chandler Act of 1938, ch. 575,
52 Stat. 840, repealed by Bankruptcy Reform Act of 1978, Pub. L. No. 95-598, 92 Stat. 2549,
2682 [hereinafter cited as Bankruptcy Act].
2. Under § 14a of the Bankruptcy Act an adjudication of any person, except a corpora-
tion, operated as an application for a discharge, and a corporation was authorized to apply
for a discharge within six months after its adjudication. The former Rules of Bankruptcy
Procedure eliminated the need for such constructive or actual applications for discharge.
Former Bankruptcy Rule 404(d) required a discharge to be granted to any bankrupt on
expiration of the time for filing a complaint objecting to discharge unless one of four speci-
fied conditions applied. In addition, former Bankruptcy Rule 404(h) required that notice of
the discharge of an individual be given to creditors.
Confirmation of a Chapter XI or Chapter XII plan effected a discharge under the Bank-
ruptcy Act regardless of the type of debtor involved. Bankruptcy Act §§ 371, 476; former
Rules of Bankruptcy Procedure 11-43, 12-42; 11 U.S.C. app. (1982).
3. UNIF. PARTNERSHIP AcT § 31(5) (1914); F. MECHEM, ELEMENTS OF A PARTNERSHIP
§ 362 (2d ed. 1920).
4. Bankruptcy Act § 5j (first sentence); J. MAcLACHLAN, BANKRuPTCY 425 (1956). The
qualifying reference in the text to the ordinary situation allows for the unusual result
reached in Levy v. Cohen, 19 Cal. 3d 165, 561 P.2d 252, 137 Cal. Rptr. 162, cert. denied, 434
U.S. 833 (1977) (discussed infra notes 102-05 and accompanying text).
5. 11 U.S.C. § 727(a)(1) (1982).
6. The legislative reports accompanying the bills that ultimately became the Bank-
ruptcy Reform Act of 1978 explained that "[t]he change in policy will avoid trafficking in
corporate shells and in bankruptcy partnerships." H.R. REP. No. 595, 95th Cong., 1st Sess.
384 (1977); S. REP. No. 989, 95th Cong., 2d Sess. 98 (1978). The Commission on Bankruptcy
Laws of the United States recommended that a discharge be granted only to an individual
debtor. REPORT OF THE COMMISSION ON BANKRupTcy LAWS OF THE UNITED STATES, H.R. Doc.
No. 137, Part II, 93rd Cong., 1st Sess. 134 (1973) [hereinafter cited as COMMISSION REPORT
II]. The Commission's recommendation was accompanied by the following comment:
"[E]liminating the discharge of corporate bankrupts restricts the manipulative use of bank-
rupt shells in violation of securities laws and other legislation protecting public investors in
and creditors of corporations." Id. This comment reflected a concern informally expressed to
the Commission -by members of the staff of the Securities and Exchange Commission. The
report did not mention the recommendation's expected effect upon trafficking in bankrupt
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Provisions for the discharge of a partnership in a Chapter 11
case under the Bankruptcy Code are, on the other hand, more lib-
eral than the provisions for discharge of an individual since the list
of debts excepted from discharge in section 523 applies only to an
individual.7 Under section 1141(d)(1), the confirmation of a part-
nership's plan of reorganization constitutes a discharge of all part-
nership debts, unless the plan or the order confirming the plan
provides otherwise.8 Confirmation of a Chapter XI or Chapter XII
plan under the Bankruptcy Act did not constitute a comprehensive
discharge, 9 but Congress, when it enacted Chapter 11 of the Bank-
ruptcy Reform Act, manifestly concluded that the reorganization
of a business unit should not be subject to the handicap and
hazards of undischarged liabilities.10 Chapter 11 may be utilized to
partnerships.
7. See 11 U.S.C. §§ 523, 1141(d)(2) (1982). Provisions for discharge of a corporation in
a Chapter 11 case are likewise more liberal than for an individual. See infra note 10. An
individual cannot obtain a discharge from debts listed in § 523 in either a Chapter 7 or a
Chapter 11 case.
8. 11 U.S.C. § 1141(d)(1) (1982). A discharge under § 1141(d)(1)(A) is effective against
(1) prepetition debts; (2) debts treated under § 502(g), (h), and (i) as if they were prepeti-
tion debts; and (3) debts that arose before the date of confirmation. Moreover, the discharge
is effective whether a proof of claim is filed or deemed fied, and irrespective of whether the
claim was allowed and of whether the holder of the claim accepted or rejected the plan. The
scope of the discharge under subparagraph (d)(1)(A) of § 1114 is the same whether the
debtor is a partnership, a corporation, or an individual. Discharge of the debt of a creditor
who received no notice of the Chapter 11 proceeding, however, might be vulnerable to at-
tack on constitutional grounds. See infra note 32 and accompanying text.
9. Confirmation of a plan under Chapter XI or XH discharged a debtor from all liabil-
ities provided for in the plan as limited by the order of confirmation, but excluding debts
not dischargeable under § 17. Bankruptcy Act §§ 371, 476.
10. The bill that the Senate originally passed to overhaul the Bankruptcy Act pro-
vided that confirmation of a Chapter 11 plan would not discharge taxes accorded priority
under § 507 and tax liabilities accruing during and after the Chapter 11 case pursuant to a
prepetition agreement. See S. 2266, 95th Cong., 2d Seas. (1978); S. RE. No. 989, supra note
6, at 129-30. These exceptions to the effect of a discharge under § 1141 were deleted in the
reconciliation of the House and Senate bills with the following explanation:
It is necessary for a corporation or partnership undergoing reorganization to be able to
present its creditors with a fixed list of liabilities upon which the creditors or third
parties can make intelligent decisions. Retaining an exception for discharge with re-
spect to nondischargeable taxes would leave an undesirable uncertainty surrounding
reorganizations that is unacceptable.
124 CONG. REc. 32408 (1978) (statement of Rep. Edwards); id. at 34008 (statement of Sen.
DeConcini); see also id. at 32416-17; id. at 34017.
An additional consideration warranting the grant of a broad discharge to a reorganized
debtor is suggested by Weintraub & Resnick, From the Bankruptcy Courts: Discharge for a
Reorganizing Corporation-Beware of the Forgotten Creditor, 17 U.C.C. L.J. 175, 175
(1984): "[D]ishonest management will most likely be replaced, and it will be undesirable to
penalize new management, as well as shareholders and creditors, for the unscrupulous con-
duct of former employees [by denying discharge]." Id.
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effect liquidation, however, and a discharge is not necessary when
a debtor does not engage in credit transactions after confirmation.
Accordingly, the confirmation of a Chapter 11 plan does not dis-
charge a partnership if the plan provides for liquidation of sub-
stantially all the partnership's property and if the debtor does not
engage in business after consummation of the plan.11 The require-
ment that the debtor engage in business after consummation in or-
der to obtain a discharge is vague and raises potentially trouble-
some questions. Does the business engaged in by the debtor after
the consummation have to be either the same as or related to the
business engaged in before the filing of the petition or the confir-
mation of the plan? How long must the debtor engage in postcon-
summation business in order to preserve the effect of the dis-
charge? If the debtor engages in no postconsummation business of
the requisite kind, do postconfirmation creditors have to compete
on a parity with the preconfirmation creditors asserting undis-
charged claims? The legislative history is not helpful in answering
these questions. In addition, the confirmation itself is irrevocable
after 180 days following its entry, even if the confirmation was pro-
cured by fraud.12
11. Paragraph (3) of 11 U.S.C. § 1141(d) negates the effect of confirmation as a dis-
charge if
(A) the plan provides for the liquidation of all or substantially all of the property of the
estate;
(B) the debtor does not engage in business after consummation of the plan; and
(C) the debtor would be denied a discharge under section 727(a) of this title if the case
were a case under chapter 7 of the title.
11 U.S.C. § 1141(d)(3) (1982).
In order for a debtor to be discharged, subparagraph (A) requires the plan to provide
for the continuity of the enterprise rather than its liquidation, and subparagraph (B) re-
quires an actual engagement in business operation by the debtor after consummation of the
plan. The term "consummation" is not defined in the Code, but "substantial consumma-
tion" means
(A) transfer of all or substantially all of the property proposed by the plan to be
transferred;
(B) assumption by the debtor or by the successor to the debtor under the plan of the
business or of the management of all or substantially all of the property dealt with by
the plan; and
(C) commencement of distribution under the plan.
11 U.S.C. § 1101(2) (1982). Inferably from this provision, consummation occurs when all of
the property to be transferred has been transferred, all of the business or management of all
of the property dealt with by the plan has been assumed, and distribution under the plan is
complete.
The effect of subparagraph (C) of § 1141(d)(3) is to allow the discharge of an individual
if there is no ground for objection under § 727(a). See also infra notes 94-95 and accompa-
nying text.
12. 11 U.S.C. § 1144 (1982). Confirmation may never be revoked for any reason other
860
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The strong congressional concern for protecting postconfirma-
tion creditors argues for a construction of section 1141(d) that fa-
vors such creditors-particularly those creditors who extend busi-
ness credit in reliance on the confirmation-as against creditors
who seek to avoid the confirmation's effect as a discharge. The no-
tion of conditional discharge has not been favored in this coun-
try,"2 and Congress most likely did not intend to adopt this mode
of limiting debtor relief in Chapter 11. Nothing in section 1141(d)
or its legislative history suggests that a discharge effected by con-
firmation is subject to termination or modification except by revo-
cation for fraud.14 Of course, whether a partnership is discharged is
most likely an academic question once the partnership has been
liquidated.
The Bankruptcy Code leaves an open question regarding the
effects of a default in an executory or promissory provision of a
confirmed plan or of any other event that might terminate the
plan. Three paragraphs of section 1112(b) bear on this question.
The bankruptcy court may convert a Chapter 11 case to a Chapter
7 case or may dismiss the case 15 if: (1) there is inability on the part
of the debtor or other proponent of the plan to effectuate its sub-
stantial consummation; 6 (2) there is a material default by the
debtor with respect to a confirmed plan; 7 or (3) the plan termi-
than fraud and may not be revoked for that reason unless requested by a party in interest
within 180 days after entry of the confirmation order. The requesting party must carry the
burden of showing that the order of confirmation was procured by fraud, and the court is
required to enter appropriate orders to protect creditors or others who relied on the confir-
mation. Id.
13. See Boshkoff, Limited, Conditional, and Suspended Discharges in Anglo-Ameri-
can Bankruptcy Proceedings, 131 U. PA. L. REv. 69, 73-74, 113 (1982).
14. According to § 1141(d), the confirmation of a Chapter 11 plan discharges the
debtor if the plan provides for a reorganization, whether or not the debtor actually contin-
ues in business. Confirmation of a plan providing for liquidation likewise constitutes a dis-
charge if the debtor engages in business after consummation. As indicated in the text fol-
lowing the reference to note 12, the Congressional scheme will be best implemented if the
application of § 1141(d)(3) is limited to situations in which the plan calls for liquidation and
in which no business credit is extended in good faith to the debtor after confirmation. An
anomaly would exist if postconfirmation creditors would be protected against competition
from the preconfirmation creditors only if postconsummation credit were also extended.
15. The Bankruptcy Act contained comparable provisions allowing the court to con-
vert or dismiss Chapter XI and Chapter XII cases after confirmation, but these grants of
authority were conditioned on the court's having retained jurisdiction subsequent to confir-
mation. See Bankruptcy Act §§ 377, 482.
16. 11 U.S.C. § 1112(b)(7) (1982). "[S]ubstantial consummation" is defined in 11
U.S.C. § 1101(2) (1982). See supra note 11. A comparable provision was contained in § 236
of Chapter X of the Bankruptcy Act.
17. 11 U.S.C. § 1112(b)(8) (1982).
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nates on the occurrence of a condition specified in the plan.18 The
Court's authority to convert does not extend to a case in which the
debtor is a farmer19 and may be exercised only on request of a
party in interest and after notice and hearing.20 The court's discre-
tion to convert or dismiss is to be governed by its view of the best
interests of creditors and the estate. 1
If substantial consummation is not effectuated and the case
has not been closed, then no jurisdictional issue can seriously be
raised concerning the court's exercise of its authority to convert or
dismiss. The statute is not clear, however, with respect to either
the existence or extent of the court's authority when the default or
terminal condition occurs after the case has been closed. The plan
or the order of confirmation may include a provision purporting to
authorize the court to convert or dismiss and to declare the effect
of such action on the discharge provided for in section 1141(d). 22
Whether or not the court retains jurisdiction and converts or dis-
misses, there is no indication in the statute or in the legislative
history that the discharge effected by the confirmation is revoked
or modified in any way by the default or termination of the plan.3
18. 11 U.S.C. § 1112(b)(9) (1982).
19. 11 U.S.C. § 1112(c) (1982). A partnership may be a farmer. See 11 U.S.C. § 101(17)
(1982); Kennedy, Partnerships and Partners Under the Bankruptcy Reform Act and the
New (Proposed) Bankruptcy Rules, 27 ST. Louis U.L.J. 507, 514-15 (1983).
20. 11 U.S.C. § 1112(b) (1982).
21. Id.
22. 11 U.S.C. § 1141(d) (1982). The plan or the order of confirmation may include a
provision authorizing the court to retain jurisdiction until all executory features of the plan
have been performed or until a condition terminating the plan occurs. Section 368 of the
Bankruptcy Act was an open-ended grant of authority to the court to retain jurisdiction in a
Chapter XI case "if so provided in the arrangement." Section 369 mandated retention of
jurisdiction until the final allowance or disallowance of all claims affected by the arrange-
ment if those claims were filed within the time and amount limitations prescribed by § 355
of the Bankruptcy Act. Id.
23. At common law, a default or breach with respect to the promissory provisions of a
composition generally revived the debts subordinated or discharged in that composition. In
re Clarence A. Nachman Co., 6 F.2d 427, 429-30 (2d Cir. 1925); Warner Lambert Pharma-
ceutical Co. v. Sylk, 348 F. Supp. 1039, 1044 (E.D. Pa. 1971). But cf. In re Plaza Music Co.,
10 F. Supp. 310, 311 (S.D.N.Y. 1934), aff'd, 77 F.2d 1010 (2d Cir. 1935) (default held not to
revive indebtedness when composition evidenced a clear intention that precomposition in-
debtedness should be discharged and subordinated to claims of postcomposition creditors).
See generally Note, The Effect of Default by a Debtor Under a Composition Before and
After the Bankruptcy Act, 26 COLu. L. REv. 77 (1926) (discussing In re Clarence A. Nach-
man Co., supra, and emphasizing superiority of composition under the Bankruptcy Act as a
device for settling a debtor's obligations). The survival of a discharge effected by the confir-
mation of a plan notwithstanding a default or breach was recognized under the Bankruptcy
Act. See, e.g., In re Mirkus, 289 F. 732 (2d Cir. 1923); 9 COLLIER ON BANKRUPTCY 1 9.32[14]
(J. Moore 14th ed. 1975); G. GLENN, LIQUIDATION § 353 (1935). Nevertheless, confusing au-
[Vol. 38:857
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In addition, no statutory provision or legislative history indicates
the intended ranking of new debts-that is, debts arising after the
confirmation-and of debts dealt with on a parity.2"
Confirmation of a Chapter 11 plan for a partnership is binding
on the creditors of the firm and its general partners, irrespective of
whether their claims and interest are impaired and irrespective of
whether they accepted the plan.2 5 Moreover, section 1141(c) pro-
vides that, except as provided in subsection (d)(3) and except as
thority held that if a Chapter XI case were dismissed rather than converted after confirma-
tion, then the obligations of the debtor under the confirmed plan were extinguished and the
preconfirmation debts were revived. See J. MAcLACHLAN, BANKRUPTcY 413 (1956) (citing In
re Setzler, 73 F. Supp. 314 (S.D. Cal. 1947)); see also Vogel v. Mohawk Elec. Sales Co., 126
F.2d 759, 761 (2d Cir. 1942) (court stated in dictum that if a court retains jurisdiction in a
Chapter XI case pursuant to a provision in the plan, then the arrangement case must be
dismissed in the event of a default "and that of course revives the old debts"; court gave no
basis for this conclusion).
24. The Bankruptcy Act contained a medley of provisions dealing with the ranking of
claims discharged by a confirmed plan that failed to be carried out and claims of postcon-
firmation creditors. Section 64b of the Bankruptcy Act as enacted in 1938 awarded priority
to claims of postconfirmation creditors over the provable claims of other creditors in the
event of the setting aside of a confirmation. Section 64b was a recast of § 64c of the prior
law and was intended to remedy the prior provision's defects, but neither provision was ever
discussed in a reported opinion in the context of the setting aside of a confirmation. But cf.
Vogel v. Mohawk Elec. Sales Co., 126 F.2d 759 (2d Cir. 1942) (court assumed in a Chapter
XI case under the Bankruptcy Act that § 64b applied, although the case involved the failure
of a confirmed plan to be carried out rather than a confirmation that was set aside; as a
result, the postconfirmation creditors were awarded priority over the preconfirmation credi-
tors), criticized in J. MAcLACHLAN, BANKRUPTcY 416 n.10 (1956) (court should have applied
"basic principles of equity," which would have "require[d] a conformity to the reasonable
expectation [of the new creditors] to share with the old creditors on the basis of the old
claims as they stood when the new credit was extended").
In 1952, "after an extensive exploration, a different approach and treatment were devel-
oped for dealing with the new debts." S. Rxp. No. 1395, 82d Cong., 2d Sess. 5 (1952). Section
64b was repealed by Pub. L. No. 456, 66 Stat. 420, 426 (1952), and the new treatment of old
and new debts were prescribed by several new sections in Chapters XI, XII, and XhI:
Under the set-up of the new sections, provided for [in] chapter XI (sec. 381), chapter
XII (sec. 486) and chapter XIII (sec. 669), where there has been a default in the con-
summation of an arrangement or plan and an order is entered directing that bank-
ruptcy be proceeded with, it is fair and equitable to provide that, in the ensuing bank-
ruptcy liquidation, the new provable unsecured debts, incurred after the confirmation
of the arrangement or plan and before the entry of the order directing bankruptcy,
shall share on a parity with the old provable unsecured debts, and if scaled, then to the
extent scaled, as provided by the arrangement of the plan, and less any payments made
thereon thereunder. This treatment recognizes the reasonable expectancies of the new
and old creditors, who acted in reliance upon the confirmed arrangement or plan. The
new creditors, looking to the debtor's property for the payment of their debts, recog-
nized that such property was also available to the old unsecured debts, scaled or other-
wise, and provided by the confirmed arrangement plan; while the old creditors must
expect that new credit will be extended and new debt incurred.
SEN. REP. No. 1395, supra, at 6.
25. 11 U.S.C. § 1141(a) (1982).
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the plan or order of confirmation provides otherwise, 26 confirma-
tion of the plan vests the property of the estate in the partnership,
free of all claims of creditors and the interests of the general
partners.27
A partner's commission of an act specified in any of the
paragraphs of section 727(a) ordinarily has no bearing on the ques-
tion whether the partnership should be discharged. The partner-
ship cannot get a discharge in a Chapter 7 case, and its right to
discharge in a Chapter 11 case is ordinarily automatic on the con-
firmation of a plan of reorganization. 28 A plan or a court order
might conceivably qualify the confirmation by reference to an act
of a partner, but confirmation is not subject to statutory objection
based on section 727(a).
Paragraph (4) of section 1141(d) authorizes the court to ap-
prove a written waiver of discharge executed by the debtor after
26. To the extent that a confirmed plan or the order of confirmation provides for pay-
ment of a claim, that claim is not discharged. Thus, the court may expressly condition the
discharge resulting from confirmation on the final determination of issues raised in litigation
pending in another court. Bittner v. Borne Chem. Co. (In re Borne Chem. Co.), 16 Bankr.
509, 514 (Bankr. D.N.J. 1981), af'd, 691 F.2d 134 (3d Cir. 1982); cf. Slaw Constr. Corp. v.
Hughes Foulkrod Const. Co. (In re Slaw Constr. Corp.), 17 Bankr. 744 (Bankr. E.D. Pa.
1982) (confirmation does not preclude assertion of counterclaim against debtor in litigation
involving executory contract that was neither assumed nor rejected by the debtor). The
bankruptcy court acknowledged in Borne that in effect it was requiring a conditional waiver
of discharge by the debtor with respect to the claims being litigated in a state court action.
16 Bankr. at 514.
27. The language excepting the provision in 11 U.S.C. § 1141(d)(3) from the opera-
tional effect of the order of confirmation was added by § 513(b) of the Bankruptcy Amend-
ments and Federal Judgeship Act of 1984, Pub. L. No. 98-353, 98 Stat. 333, 387. The effect
of a confirmation order under § 1141(c) prior to the amendment apparently has not been
considered in any reported case.
28. The discharge may not be automatic if: (1) the plan or order of confirmation pro-
vides otherwise, pursuant to the exception introducing § 1141(d)(1); or (2) the three condi-
tions specified in § 1141(d)(3) exist. With respect to conditions in the plan or order of con-
firmation qualifying the discharge, see supra note 26 and accompanying text. With respect
to the three conditions of § 1141(d)(3), see supra notes 11-14 and accompanying text.
Whether the three conditions of § 1141(d)(3) exist will be determined ordinarily when a
creditor seeks to enforce an obligation of the debtor in disregard of the terms of the con-
firmed plan. Under § 524(a)(2), a discharge effected by § 1141 operates as an injunction
against any attempt to enforce a personal liability of the debtor. The effect of the confirma-
tion may be litigated in a court other than a bankruptcy court, but a proceeding in the
bankruptcy court to determine the effect of confirmation or to enforce the statutory injunc-
tion predicated on a discharge by § 524(a)(2) is probably a core proceeding. Whether a given
act against a partnership would violate the injunction depends on the court's resolution of
the issues raised under § 1141(d)(3). Neither the statute nor any rule of procedure indicates
who has the burden of proof in a proceeding testing or challenging a discharge, but in view
of the exceptional character of a proceeding based on § 1141(d)(3), the burden would likely
fall on the creditor seeking recovery. Cf. Bankruptcy Rule 4005.
864
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the entry of on order for relief.2 9 This provision is similar to a pro-
viso in section 14a of the Bankruptcy Act, which was modified by
former Bankruptcy Rule 405.30 Neither the legislative history of
paragraph (4) nor previous case law illuminates the question
whether fewer than all general partners may execute such a waiver.
Therefore, considerations outside the realm of bankruptcy law, in-
cluding the terms of the partnership agreement that define the
scope of non-unanimous partner actions, must govern the determi-
nation of this question.3'
Notwithstanding the apparent breadth and unconditional
character of the discharge effected by a confirmation of a Chapter
11 plan, exceptions have been engrafted by judicial construction.
Thus, at least one court has held that a prepetition claim which
was not listed or scheduled may not be discharged consistently
with due process guaranties if the claimant received no notice or
knowledge of the pendency of the bankruptcy case in time to file
the claim.32 Another court has ruled that if an executory contract
neither is assumed nor rejected before confirmation, a claim arising
out of the contract may be asserted against a reorganized debtor
notwithstanding the omission of any reference to the claim in the
plan or order of confirmation.8
29. 11 U.S.C. § 1141(d)(4) (1982). Paragraph (4) of § 1141(d) was included in the bill
that the Senate originally passed to overhaul the Bankruptcy Act, but was not included in
the House's version of the bill. See S. 2266, 95th Cong. 2d Sess. (1978); H.R. 8200, 95th
Cong., 2d Sess. (1978); S. REP. No. 989, supra note 6, at 130; 124 CONG. REc. 34008 (1978)
(statement of Sen. DeConcini); Id. 32408 (1978) (statement of Rep. Edwards).
30. Former Bankruptcy Rule 405 eliminated the requirement of § 14a's proviso for a
waiver before the hearing on an application for discharge, by eliminating altogether the ne-
cessity of such an application. 11 U.S.C. app. at 216 (1982). The current Bankruptcy Rules
contain no provision relating to waiver of discharge.
31. See Kennedy, supra note 19, at 519-20 nn.52-54.
32. Reliable Elec. Co. v. Olson Constr. Co., 726 F.2d 620 (10th Cir. 1984); see also 5
COLLIER ON BANKRuPTcY I 1141.01[4][b] (L. King 15th ed. 1984); Weintraub & Resnick,
From the Bankruptcy Courts: Discharge for a Reorganizing Corporation-Beware of the
Forgotten Creditor, 17 U.C.C. L.J. 175 (1984). Discharge of an omitted creditor was denied
in the Reliable Elec. Co. case although shortly after the filing of the Chapter 11 petition, the
debtor's attorney had given notice of the filing to the creditor's attorney by telephone. 726
F.2d at 621.
33. See Slaw Constr. Corp. v. Hughes Foulkrod Constr. Co. (In re Slaw Constr. Corp.),
17 Bankr. 744 (Bankr. E.D. Pa. 1982); cf. Mt. Wheeler Power v. Gallagher, 98 Nev. 479, 653
P.2d 1212 (1982) (claim ruled enforceable against partners after close of partnership's
bankruptcy).
The court in Slaw Constr. Corp. did not rule finally on the collectibility of a creditor's
claim against the reorganized debtor, but still declined to dismiss the creditor's counter-
claim on several alternate grounds: (1) the counterclaim might be entitled to payment as an
administrative expense; (2) because the debtor did not include the creditor's claim in the
schedule or plan, the creditor received no notice of the necessity of filing a claim and thus
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Although the grant of discharge under section 1141 constitutes
a bar to a second discharge in a case commenced within six years
after the filing of the petition in the case in which the first dis-
charge was obtained, this bar appears only in section 727(a).
Therefore, because section 727 does not apply in any other way to
the discharge effected under Chapter 11, there is no six-year bar to
a second discharge of a partnership. 4
II. DISCHARGE OF A GENERAL PARTNER
A. In a Chapter 7 Case
Under the Bankruptcy Code, as was the case under the Bank-
ruptcy Act, a partner may be discharged from his liability for part-
nership debts as well as for his "nonpartnership '3 5 debts in a liqui-
dation case, whether or not the partnership estate is administered
under the bankruptcy law. The Code follows prior law by not
should be given an opportunity to prove its claim; (3) the debtor did not notify the court of
the pendency of the counterclaim at the time the court confirmed the plan; (4) if the
debtor's plan did not provide for the claim, then the claim would not be discharged; and (5)
notwithstanding § 524(a)(2), mutual debts may be "set off" against each other, regardless of
when suit thereon is instituted and regardless of whether the defendant's claim against the
plaintiff has been discharged. 17 Bankr. at 746-48.
The Mt. Wheeler Power court took the extraordinary step of declaring that a claim
based on services rendered a debtor in possession pursuant to an executory contract was
enforceable after the close of bankruptcy. The debtor was a partnership, presumably no
longer in existence and devoid of assets in any event, but the court, ignoring the considera-
tions that had impelled a dismissal below, ruled that there was an implied assumption of the
electrical service contract by the debtor in possession and that the partners were liable for
the services rendered although they were not debtors in the case. 98 Nev. at 482-83, 653
P.2d at 1214.
34. The six-year bar applied to the discharge of a partnership under § 14c(5) of the
Bankruptcy Act, but, by virtue of the ease with which a partnership could add, drop, or
change partners, the provision caused little difficulty for a partnership seeking a discharge
under that Act. See, e.g., In re Neyland & McKeithen, 184 F. 144, 150 (S.D. Miss. 1910)
(six-year bar afforded no ground of objection to grant of discharge to a partnership having
one partner in common with partnership discharged in an earlier case). A change in mem-
bership of a partnership ordinarily effects a dissolution. F. MECHEM, ELEMENTS OF PARTNER-
SHIP §§ 57, 359 (2d ed. 1920).
35. Section 421(f)(1) of the Bankruptcy Amendments and Federal Judgeship Act of
1984 substituted "nonpartnership" for the term "separate" in identifying a partner's prop-
erty and debts that are not attributable to his membership in the firm. Pub. L. No. 98-353,
98 Stat. 333, 368.
36. The grant or denial of a discharge in a liquidation case is governed by § 727. As
pointed out in the text accompanying supra note 5, only an individual may be discharged
under § 727(1), and thus a corporate partner or a partnership that is itself a partner in a
debtor partnership cannot obtain a discharge from the partnership debts in a liquidation
case.
The second sentence of § 5j of the Bankruptcy Act explicitly authorized a discharge of a
partner from both his partnership and his individual debts whether he was adjudicated
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providing for discharge of the partners as a result of the adminis-
tration of the partnership estate in bankruptcy.3 7 Even though the
trustee of the partnership may have recovered nonpartnership
property from one or more of the partners to meet a deficiency of
bankrupt separately or along with the partnership in a concurrent case. Some early cases
under the Bankruptcy Act held that there could be no discharge of either a partner or a
partnership from partnership debts without a partnership adjudication and administration
of the partnership's estate. See, e.g., In re Mercur, 122 F. 384, 389-90 (3d Cir. 1903); In re
Meyers, 96 F. 408, 411-12 (S.D.N.Y. 1899). The second sentence of § 5j codified the position
taken in the preponderant number of cases decided before 1938, the year that the Chandler
Act, ch. 575, 52 Stat. 840, 846 [hereinafter cited as Chandler Act], added § 5j to the Bank-
ruptcy Act. See, e.g., In re Diamond, 149 F. 407 (2d Cir. 1906).
The Bankruptcy Reform Act's absence of any counterpart for § 5j affords no basis for
an argument that discharge of a partner is dependent on administration of the partnership
estate. Under § 723(c), the partnership trustee competes ratably with the separate creditors
of the partner in the administration of the partner's estate. 11 U.S.C. § 723(c) (1982). The
partnership creditors are arguably entitled likewise to share ratably with the partner's sepa-
rate creditors when only the partner's estate is being administered under the Code. See
Kennedy, Partnerships and Partners Under the Bankruptcy Code: Claims and Distribu-
tion, 40 WASH. & LEE L. REv. 55, 76-77 (1983).
37. Cases antedating the Chandler Act of 1938 generally held that the discharge of a
partnership would not discharge the partners from the partnership debts. See, eg., In re
Neyland & McKeithen, 184 F. 144, 150-51 (S.D. Miss. 1910); In re Pincus, 147 F. 621, 625
(S.D.N.Y. 1906). A few cases, however, had held that the discharge of a partnership would
discharge the partners from the firm's debts if the partners and their separate property were
"drawn into" the administration of the partnership estate. See, e.g., Armstrong v. Norris,
247 F. 253, 255-56 (8th Cir. 1917); cf. Abbott v. Anderson, 265 Ill. 285, 291, 106 N.E. 782,
784 (1914) (partners held to be discharged by composition in bankruptcy although partners'
assets were not drawn into the administration of the case); 1A COLLIER ON BANKRuprcy
5.15, at 717 (J. Moore 14th ed. 1978) ("Under the Act of 1898 most cases held that where
the partnership alone was adjudicated, firm debts only would be barred by the discharge of
the firm"). The Chandler Act settled this conflict by adding Bankruptcy Act § 5j, which
provided that "[t]he discharge of partnership shall not discharge the individual partners
thereof from the partnership debts."
For an elaborate argument that an individual partner should be discharged whenever
his estate has also been subjected to administration, whether or not he was adjudicated or
bankrupt, see Legislative Note, Partnership Bankruptcy Under the Chandler Act, 87 U. PA.
L. Rav. 105, 112-14 (1938). The notewriter argued that the first sentence of § 5j of the Bank-
ruptcy Act imposed an inequitable burden on the partner, particularly when the provision
left the partner saddled with joint obligations notwithstanding administration of both the
partnership and partner's estates. Id. at 112. The author thought that the rule imposed by
the Chandler Act would have "the practical effect of forcing the individual member to seek
protection in the less desired form of adjudication under voluntary proceedings." Id. at 114.
The note did not indicate what is undesirable about an adjudication of an individual part-
ner in a voluntary bankruptcy case.
The "incongruity" of denying a discharge to a partner from firm debts after all the firm
creditors' rights have been satisfied against the partnership and partner's estate was also
lamented in Comment, Unaccomplished Reforms in Partnership Bankruptcy Under the
Chandler Act, 49 YALE L.J. 908, 924 (1940). This comment regarded as harsh and unjustifi-
able the requirement that a bankrupt partner submit all his property to the bankruptcy
court in order to be discharged from firm debts. Id. The author did not elaborate a need for
a split discharge from such debts.
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the partnership assets to cover the partnership debts,38 the part-
ners' contribution to the payment of these debts constitutes no ba-
sis for their discharge. An order for relief concerning a debtor must
ordinarily have been entered in order for a discharge to be ob-
tained,39 but unless a statutory ground for objecting to discharge is
timely asserted and sustained, the court does not have discretion
to withhold a discharge of an individual debtor. °
1. Standing to Object
Objections to discharge in a liquidation case are governed by
section 727 of Title 11. Under section 727(c)(1), "[t]he trustee or a
creditor may object to discharge under subsection (a) of this sec-
tion. '41 The procedure for determining whether a discharge should
be granted or denied is prescribed by Bankruptcy Rule 4004. The
trustee in a liquidation case is not only authorized to object to the
debtor's discharge, 42 but indeed has a duty to object when advisa-
ble.43 Because the statutory provisions empowering and authoriz-
ing a trustee to object to a discharge refer only to the trustee of the
debtor, the question arises whether the trustee of the partnership
nevertheless may object to the discharge of a general partner.
Under the Bankruptcy Act, one person typically served as trustee
38. See 11 U.S.C. § 723(a), (b) (1982).
39. The proposition that an order for relief concerning a debtor is a prerequisite to
discharge is subject to the qualification that a court might occasionally disregard the re-
quirement. See Levy v. Cohen, 19 Cal. 3d 165, 561 P.2d 252, 137 Cal. Rptr. 162, cert. denied,
434 U.S. 833 (1977) (discussed infra notes 102-05 and accompanying text); see also 11
U.S.C. § 524(a)(3) (1982) (recognizing that a discharge may protect community property
acquired after the filing of a petition from community creditors of a nondebtor spouse as
well as the debtor spouse).
Occasionally the partnership trustee will release a partner pursuant to a litigation set-
tlement. See Nichols v. Emerson, 241 N.Y. 531, 150 N.E. 542 (1925) (settlement between a
partnership trustee and a limited partner); Engelhardt v. Lehrenkrauss, 260 A.D. 943, 943,
23 N.Y.S.2d 263, 264 (1940) (general releases executed by partnership trustee held to dis-
charge partners from individual liability for partnership debts).
40. "The court shall grant the debtor a discharge unless" one of ten enumerated
grounds of objection is shown to exist. 11 U.S.C. § 727(a) (1982). As under the Bankruptcy
Act, the court is not authorized to make an objection to discharge on its own initiative. Id.
41. 11 U.S.C. § 727(c)(1) (1982). The objecting creditor may be a copartner who has a
claim for contribution or indemnity against the debtor-partner arising out of payment of a
partnership debt. In re McCrady, 23 Bankr. 193, 194 (Bankr. W.D. Ky. 1982). That the
copartner's claim against the debtor's estate may be contingent and subordinated to other
creditors' claims is inconsequential. Cf. Kennedy, supra note 36, at 79 (copartner's right to
contribution qualifies as a claim although it is subordinate to unpaid creditors of the
partnership).
42. 11 U.S.C. § 727(c)(1) (1982).
43. 11 U.S.C. § 704(5) (1982).
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of both the partnership and partners' estates when the estates
were administered concurrently.44 The simultaneous representation
of multiple estates seems not to have raised any question of the
trustee's standing to object to the discharge of any debtors whose
estates are being administered. If the same person may serve as
trustee of both the partnership estate and a partner's estate under
the Bankruptcy Code, as the House Report suggested," then the
authority and duty to object to the discharge of the partner should
be unaffected by the dual character of the trustee's representation.
The reported cases under the Bankruptcy Act did not consider
the standing of a partnership trustee to object to the discharge of a
partner when the partner's estate was being administered by a dif-
ferent trustee. The issue is more likely to arise under the Bank-
ruptcy Code. Since a creditor is also authorized to object to the
discharge of a debtor under section 727(c)(1), the partnership trus-
tee arguably has standing as a creditor of the debtor.46 On the
other hand, the purpose of giving the partnership trustee a claim
against a partner's estate is to facilitate distribution out of the
partner's estate while minimizing the risk of double proof of part-
nership creditors. 47 This legislative purpose is furthered by disal-
44. See Kennedy, supra note 19, at 572-74.
45. See HR. REP. No. 595, supra note 6, at 198. The double trusteeship suggestion
rested on the absence of any statutory prohibition on such dual representation. The Report,
however, recognized the risk of a conflict of interest in such representation. See id.
46. A "creditor" as defined in 11 U.S.C. § 101(9) (1982) includes an "entity that has a
claim against the debtor that arose at the time of or before the order for relief concerning
the debtor." Under § 723(c), the trustee of a partnership has a claim against the estate of a
partner who is a debtor in a Chapter 7 case. The partnership trustee's § 723(c) claim argua-
bly does not arise unless and until two events concur: the entry of an order for relief in the
partner's case and the qualification of the partnership trustee under § 322. If the qualifica-
tion occurs after the entry of the order for relief in the partner's case, it could be contended
that the partnership trustee is not a creditor of the partner's estate-if indeed he is such a
creditor under any circumstances. This argument, however, would ignore the nature of the
partnership trustee's claim, which is simply the aggregate of all the partnership creditors'
claims against the debtor's estate. The validity, amount, and priority of the partnership
trustee's claims are unaffected by statutory transfer, and it would be astonishing if the effect
of the statutory transfer were to leave the claims without a creditor to hold them.
Independent of § 723(c) implications, however, the partnership has a claim against a
partner's estate for the amount necessary to enable the partnership to pay its debts. UNiP.
PARTNERSHIP AcT § 40(a)(ll) (1914); H. R. REP. No. 595, supra note 6, at 198; see Kennedy,
supra note 36, at 77-79. The partnership's claim against the partner's estate was recognized
even more explicitly under § 5h of the Bankruptcy Act. The contingent nature of the part-
nership's claim alone does not warrant disqualification of the partnership's or the partner-
ship trustee's right to object to the partner's discharge. See In re McCrady, 23 Bankr. 193,
195 (Bankr. W.D. Ky. 1982); Ex parte Traphagen, 24 F. Cas. 134, 135 (S.D.N.Y. 1842) (No.
14,140).
47. See H. R. REP. No. 595, supra note 6, at 381; S. REP. No. 989, supra note 6, at 95.
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lowance of the partnership creditors' claims against the partner's
estate because only the partnership trustee's claim on behalf of all
the creditors he represents will be considered and paid. Implemen-
tation of this legislative purpose, however, does not require that
only the partnership trustee be authorized to object to the dis-
charge of the partner. If the partnership estate does not have a
trustee, then the standing of a partnership creditor to object to the
partner's discharge pursuant to section 727(c)(1) cannot be
doubted.48 Ordinarily,49 there is no reason why a partnership credi-
tor should not have as much standing to object to a partner's dis-
charge as do the partner's nonpartnership creditors, whether or not
there is also a partnership trustee who might file an objection. The
bankruptcy courts have not been swamped with objections to dis-
charge. The policy of centering in the trustee the right and duty to
object to claims5 ° has not been extended to the filing of objections
to discharge. Courts should be receptive to objections to discharge
of a partner, whether filed by the trustee of the partner's estate or
of the partnership estate or by a separate creditor or a partnership
creditor. This conclusion is consonant with the congressional policy
reflected in section 15727(a)(1), which authorizes the United States
trustee as well as the trustee or a creditor of the debtor to object to
discharge in a pilot district.
51
48. A partnership creditor is entitled to share in the distribution of the partner's es-
tate ratably with nonpartnership creditors. See Kennedy, supra note 36, at 61-63.
49. The statement in the text would arguably not apply when all the partnership cred-
itors have been or will be paid if one or more nonpartnership creditors remain or will remain
unpaid after the administration of the partner's estate. This possibility may occur because,
notwithstanding the right of the partner's creditors to share ratably with the partnership
creditors in the partner's estate, the partnership estate may suffice to pay all the partner-
ship creditors. Standing to object to a debtor's discharge, however, clearly is not limited
only to creditors injured by the act or conduct that is the ground for objection. See Pugh v.
ADCO, Inc., 329 F.2d 362, 364-65 (5th Cir. 1964); Cunningham v. Elco Distrib., Inc., 189
F.2d 87, 89-91 (6th Cir. 1951); In re Wells, 248 F. Supp. 224, 227-28 (N.D. Ala. 1965).
50. "While the debtor's other creditors may make objections to the allowance of a
claim, the demands of orderly and expeditious administration have led to a recognition that
the right to object [to a claim] is generally exercised by the trustee. Pursuant to § 502(a) of
the Code, however, any party in interest may object to a claim." FED. R. BAN 3007 advi-
sory committee note.
51. The conclusion in the text may be subject to the technical objection that it treats
both the partnership trustee and the partnership creditors as creditors of a partner in re-
spect to the same claims. Equal treatment, however, conforms to reality. The partnership
trustee is simply a statutory assignee for the purpose of enforcement of the partnership
creditors' claims against the estate and may appropriately be treated as a creditor of the
estate for certain purposes. The statutory assignment is not intended to deprive the part-
nership creditors of their substantive rights against the partner or his estate. For example,
§ 723(c) clearly does not deprive a partnership creditor of the right to seek a determination
870
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Additional evidence reveals congressional intent that objection
to a debtor's discharge not fail because of lack of an objector. Any
"party in interest" may request the court to order the trustee52 or,
in a pilot district, the United States trustee5 1 to examine the acts
and conduct of a debtor to determine whether a ground exists for
denial of discharge. A "party in interest" is not defined in the
Bankruptcy Reform Act,54 but in a partner's case the term cer-
tainly includes a creditor of the partner's estate and, arguably, ei-
ther the partnership trustee or a partnership creditor. No stated
bankruptcy policy would be served by a niggling construction of
the term "party in interest" as used in the provision for requesting
examination of the debtor's acts and conduct.
2. Grounds of Objection to Discharge
The original justification for a discharge in bankruptcy was to
reward cooperating debtors.5 5 Grounds of objection to discharge
continue to include acts of obstruction and failure to cooperate in
that his claim was not dischargeable under § 523. The policy of § 727 is furthered best if
both the partnership trustee and the partnership creditors have standing to object to the
partner's discharge.
52. 11 U.S.C. § 727(c)(2) (1982).
53. 11 U.S.C. § 15727(a)(2) (1982).
54. "The phrase. . . 'on request of a party in interest' .. is intended to restrict the
court from acting sua sponte. Rules of bankruptcy procedure or court decisions will deter-
mine who is a party in interest for the particular purposes of the provision in question
.... " 124 CONG. REC. 33993 (1978) (statement of Sen. DeConcini); id. at 32393 (1978)
(statement of Rep. Edwards).
An indication that Congress did not intend that a restrictive approach be taken with
respect to the standing of a creditor with a contingent claim is found in 11 U.S.C. § 502(a).
Section 502(a) explicitly recognizes that a creditor of a partner is a party in interest for the
purpose of objecting to a claim against a partnership debtor. Because the partnership trus-
tee may seek recovery of a deficiency of the partnership property to pay partnership debts
from the partner's estate or may assert a claim against a debtor partner's estate in the
aggregate amount of all the partnership's creditors' claims, a partner's separate creditor may
be adversely affected by the allowance of inflated claims of partnership creditors against the
partnership estate. See 124 CONG. REc. 32396 (1978) (statement of Rep. Edwards); id. at
33996 (1978) (statement of Sen. DeConcini). This injury may be real although the partner's
creditor may not assert a claim directly against the partnership estate in competition with
the partnership's creditors. Because a partnership's creditor is in direct competition with a
partner's creditors in seeking collection from the partner or his estate, the argument for
according standing to the partnership's creditor, or to the partnership trustee as his surro-
gate, to object to the partner's discharge is more compelling.
55. See United States v. Kras, 409 U.S. 434, 447 (1973) (quoting and citing J. MAc-
LACHLAN, BANKRUPTCY 20-21, 88 (1956)); see also Kennedy, Reflections on the Bankruptcy
Laws of the United States: The Debtor's Fresh Start, 76 W. VA. L. Rnv. 427, 434-435 (1974)
(discharge encourages prompt surrender of the debtor's assets).
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connection with the administration of the debtor's estate,56 but to-
day acts of dishonesty and prejudice or potential prejudice to cred-
itors occurring before the commencement of the debtor's case also
constitute such grounds.57 An additional ground of objection to
discharge-namely, that the debtor had obtained a discharge in a
prior case under the bankruptcy laws within a prescribed pe-
riod,58-does not fit easily within either of these two classes of
objections.
Several specifications of the grounds of objection to discharge
in section 727(a) of the Bankruptcy Reform Act refer to the prop-
erty of the debtor or the estate, the debtor's financial affairs or
condition, or the debtor's business transactions. 9 A debtor who is
also a partner may plausibly contend that an act or conduct which
is engaged in on behalf of the partnership or that involves only the
partnership's property does not constitute a ground for objecting
to or denying his discharge. At least under section 14c(3) of the
Bankruptcy Act, however, if a partner obtained money on credit
for his partnership by issuing a false financial statement regarding
the partnership's financial condition, then he would not be relieved
from accountability.60 The reported cases held that the partner's
56. See 11 U.S.C. § 727(a)(4)-(7) (1982).
57. See 11 U.S.C. § 727(a)(2), (3), (7) (1982).
58. See 11 U.S.C. § 727(a)(8), (9) (1982).
59. See 11 U.S.C. § 727(a)(2) (1982) (referring to "property of the debtor" and "prop-
erty of the estate"); 11 U.S.C. § 727(a) (3) (1982) (referring to "the debtor's financial condi-
tion or business transactions"); 11 U.S.C. § 727(a) (4)(D) (1982) (referring to "the debtor's
property or financial affairs").
60. See Marimura, Arai & Co. v. Taback, 279 U.S. 24, 33 (1929); Bernstein v. Associ-
ates Discount Corp. (In re Bernstein), 197 F.2d 378, 381-82 (7th Cir. 1952); Woolen Corp. of
America v. Gitnig, 33 F.2d 259, 260-61 (3d Cir. 1929); Ragan, Malone & Co. v. Cotton &
Preston, 200 F. 546, 550 (5th Cir. 1912); In re Fineberg, 36 F.2d 392, 393-94 (W.D.N.Y.
1929); see also Levy v. Industrial Fin. Corp., 276 U.S. 281 (1928) (denying discharge to a
bankrupt because he had obtained money by use of a false financial statement for a corpora-
tion that he controlled).
The Bernstein court was not deterred from denying discharge merely because § 14c(3),
the relevant provision of the Bankruptcy Act, required the bankrupt's false statement to
relate to "his financial condition." Section 14c(3) was later amended to grant expressly a
ground of objection to discharge with respect to a debtor who
while engaged in business as a sole proprietor, partnership, or as an executive of a
corporation obtained for such business money or property on credit or as an extension
or renewal of credit by making or publishing. . . a materially false statement in writ-
ing respecting his financial condition or the financial condition of such partnership or
corporation . ...
74 Stat. 408 (1960) (emphasis added); see H.R. REP. No. 1111, 86th Cong. 1st Sess. (1959).
The primary purpose of this amendment was to preclude denial of discharge to a consumer
debtor on the ground of misrepresentation of financial condition. The amendment, however,
also served to codify the position taken in the Bernstein case.
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personal involvement in the transaction was a sufficient basis for
denial of his discharge. Although the Bankruptcy Code does not
contain a counterpart of section 14c(3) of the Bankruptcy Act,"'
the construction given section 14c(3) should nevertheless be per-
suasive in construing section 727 of the Bankruptcy Code.6 2
As was pointed out in 1A COLLIER ON BANKRUPTCY D 14.39, at 1391-92 (J. Moore 14th
ed. 1978), the amendment was susceptible of a narrow construction:
A logical interpretation of the clause, and one in accord with the general statutory rule
of construction known as reddendo singula singulis, would be that only where the indi-
vidual is in business as a sole proprietor would a false statement concerning his indi-
vidual financial condition operate as a bar to his discharge.
Such a construction, however, would appear to weaken the clause more than is
warranted or needed to meet the rationale of the 1960 amendment. Where a person
gives a statement of his own finances for the purposes of inducing a creditor to lend
money to a business in which he is interested, or to which he bears a relationship,
whether this operates to bar his discharge should not depend on the form of the busi-
ness, viz., corporate, partnership or sole proprietorship. There is no reason to believe
that the abuses which led to the 1960 amendment will be cured by such an interpreta-
tion, and sound practical reasons dictate a contrary construction. It is self-evident that
in the case of a partnership the potential creditor has a real interest in the individual
financial picture of the partners for their property can be reached to satisfy partner-
ship debts.
The construction suggested in Collier was followed in In re Wells, 248 F. Supp. 224
(N.D. Ala. 1965), in which a corporate executive was denied a discharge on account of false
financial statements relative to partnership and corporate business without regard to
whether his individual creditors suffered any detriment as a result of the
misrepresentations.
61. Obtaining credit by false representation, however, is the basis for an exception to
discharge under § 523(a)(2)(A). See infra note 116; infra notes 126-31 and accompanying
text.
62. When the debtor is a partner, one might argue that an act of obstruction or
prejudice to partnership creditors should be grounds for objection to his discharge only from
partnership debts, and that discharge from separate debts should be denied only for an act
injurious to separate creditors. Even if such an argument has been made, it has not been
sustained. The notion of a split discharge has generally been eschewed by Congress and the
courts. As pointed out in supra note 39, creditors nevertheless argued, and in a few cases
courts decided, under the Bankruptcy Act of 1898 that when the separate property of
unadjudicated partners has been administered in the course of a partnership bankruptcy,
the partners should be discharged from partnership debts.
Congress has prescribed grounds of objection to the grant of a discharge without any
limitation on the scope of the grant or denial according to the character of the indebtedness
as either separate or partnership. When a ground for objection to discharge is found to exist,
discharge of all debts is denied, and all creditors may pursue their claims against the debtor.
If a ground for objection is not asserted or sustained, only creditors whose claims are explic-
itly excepted by § 523 or are secured by liens that survive the administration of the case can
enforce their claims after discharge. If a discharge of a partner were to be limited by refer-
ence to whether the debts were partnership or nonpartnership obligations, it would be diffi-
cult and often impracticable to distinguish between those acts or conduct of a partner preju-
dicial only to partnership creditors and those detrimental only to nonpartnership creditors.
Since, as pointed out in supra note 48, partnership creditors share ratably with separate
creditors in the distribution of a partner's estate, any conduct of a partner coming within
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A partner might argue with some plausibility that his failure
to explain a loss or a deficiency in the assets of a partnership to
meet its liabilities does not constitute a ground of objection to his
discharge, at least when the partnership is not a debtor in a case
under the Code. Section 727(a)(5), however, does not limit the
scope of the implied duty of explanation to the assets of the
debtor, 63 and the partnership's liabilities also are considered liabil-
ities of the partner.6 4 Accordingly, the partner's argument against
the applicability of section 727(a)(5) to his failure to explain the
disappearance of partnership assets should fail. 5
Under the Bankruptcy Act, an act of one partner barring his
discharge would not operate to bar the discharge of his copartners
unless they participated in, or in some way ratified, the act.6 6
Thus, even though the fraudulent conduct of a partner resulted in
the partnership's obtaining property, the conduct did not bar the
discharge of his innocent partner.67 The case law that developed
the literal language and purpose of § 727 likely is equally objectionable to partnership and
nonpartnership creditors.
63. Partnership assets are not considered property of the partner debtor. H. R. REP.
No. 595, supra note 6, at 199-200.
64. Section 476(a) of the Bankruptcy Amendments and Federal Judgeship Act of
1984, Pub. L. No. 98-353, 98 Stat. 333, 381, amended § 723(a) of the Bankruptcy Code to
limit the liabilities of a general partner enforceable by a partnership trustee to claims for
which the partner is "personally liable." The amendment would seem to imply that a gen-
eral partner is not, or at least might not be, personally liable for all partnership debts. As
the legislative history makes clear, however, the intention of the amendment is only to pre-
clude the trustee from seeking recourse against a partner with respect to nonrecourse
claims. Although § 1111(b) entitles the holder of a nonrecourse claim to allowances as if the
holder had recourse, that provision is not applicable in a Chapter 7 case.
65. See In re Miller & Miller, 52 F. Supp. 526 (S.D. Fla. 1943); Third Nat'l Bank v.
Trew (In re Trew), 23 COLLIER BANKR. CAs. 2d (MB) 700, 705-10 (Bankr. M.D. Tenn. 1980).
The courts in these cases gave no significance to the fact that the challenged losses or defi-
ciencies related to partnership property and partnership liabilities. The Miller court empha-
sized that the duty of explanation of a deficiency of partnership assets falls "upon all mem-
bers of the partnership actively connected therewith." 52 F. Supp. at 527.
66. See, e.g., In re Richter, 57 F.2d 159, 161 (2d Cir. 1932) (discussed infra note 77).
See generally 1A COLLIER ON BANKRuPTcy D 14.31 (J. Moore 14th ed. 1978) (falsification of
books by bankrupt's partner will not bar discharge if the bankrupt is ignorant of the
wrongdoing).
67. See Doyle v. First Nat'l Bank, 231 F. 649 (4th Cir. 1916) (denial of partner's dis-
charge under former § 14c(3) of the Bankruptcy Act reversed because the partner did not
participate in preparing the false financial statement issued by his firm and did not know of
its contents or its falsity); Hardie v. Swafford Bros. Dry Goods Co., 165 F. 588 (5th Cir.
1908) (similar to Doyle); Annot., 133 A.L.R. 676 (1941). But cf. In re Simon Weltman & Co.,
2 F.2d 759, 761 (S.D.N.Y. 1924) .(burden on partners seeking discharge to show that they did
not know of false financial statement used by another partner to obtain goods on credit for
the partnership).
Note that obtaining money or property by means of a false financial statement is no
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under the Bankruptcy Act regarding the effect of a debtor's con-
duct on the right of his partner to a discharge should remain perti-
nent in the construction of section 727.
Clarification of the effect of a partner's conduct on the right to
a discharge in another case concerning his partnership or his co-
partner is provided by section 727(a)(7). Paragraph (7) allows cer-
tain of the acts specified as grounds for denial of discharge in other
paragraphs of section 727(a) to be equally available, whether com-
mitted in connection with the debtor's own case or that of an in-
sider."" This provision is intended to codify and extend the doc-
trine of a group of cases decided under the Bankruptcy Act.6 9
These cases made the conduct of a bankrupt in a case concerning
another debtor a ground of objection if the conduct came within
the literal language of section 14c of the Bankruptcy Act and was
reasonably related to the case in which the objection was made.70
longer a ground for denying discharge, § 523(a)(2)(A), but may give rise to a nondischarge-
able liability. See infra notes 116, 126-31 and accompanying text.
68. The term "insider" is defined in 11 U.S.C. § 101(25) (1982) and includes the part-
nership in which the debtor is a partner, a general partner of the debtor, or a relative of a
general partner.
69. Section 727(a)(7) was derived from § 4-505(a)(6) of the Bankruptcy Act proposed
by the Commission of Bankruptcy Laws. See COMMISSION REPORT I, supra note 6, at 132,
135.
70. These cases concerned the question whether an act or conduct of an officer or
dominant stockholder in connection with the bankruptcy of a corporation should be a
ground of objection to the discharge of the actor in a subsequent bankruptcy.
An early decision, In re Blalock, 118 F. 679 (D.S.C. 1902), sustained a discharge of a
bankrupt notwithstanding his making a false oath in the bankruptcy case of a corporation in
which he had an interest because the court found an insufficient relationship between the
two bankruptcies. District Judge Learned Hand followed Blalock in In re Lesser, 232 F. 368
(S.D.N.Y. 1916), in which the bankrupt had committed perjury in a prior bankruptcy case
involving a corporation, but this ruling was reversed on appeal in 234 F. 65 (2d Cir. 1916).
The appellate court's ruling in the Lesser case established for nearly 30 years the doctrine
that conduct defined by the Bankruptcy Act in § 14c(1) (i.e., an offense punishable under 18
U.S.C. § 152 (1982)) or in § 14c(6) (i.e., refusal to obey an order of court or to answer a
question approved by the court) could be the basis for denial of a discharge, irrespective of
the time interval or the relationship between the act and the subsequent bankruptcy. See
Schwartz, Opposition to a Discharge by Reason of Acts or Conduct in Another Bankruptcy
Proceeding, 20 REF. J. 57 (1946) (citing six cases).
The Lesser case was explicitly overruled, however, in Raphiel v. Morris Plan Indus.
Bank, 146 F.2d 340 (2d Cir. 1944), cert. denied, 324 U.S. 879 (1945), which adopted the view
taken by Judge Hand in the Lesser case. The Raphiel case held that conviction of a fraudu-
lent concealment of assets in connection with an earlier bankruptcy case should not bar a
discharge in a case commenced 15 years after the filing of the first case. The discharge in the
second case was declared to be inoperative, however, for debts provable in the first bank-
ruptcy. The Raphiel case was the genesis of the doctrine that conduct coming within the
literal language of § 14c(1) constituted a bar to a subsequent discharge only if the conduct
bore a reasonable relationship to the case in which the discharge issue arose. See Pugh v.
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The doctrine of these cases was uncertain in scope, however, and
was susceptible of an application that would bar discharge of a
debtor because of conduct many years earlier in a case involving a
connected debtor.7 1 Therefore, the Bankruptcy Code restricts the
scope of an objection based on conduct in another case in three
ways: first, the act must be specified in paragraph (2), (3), (4), (5),
or (6) of section 727(a);7 2 second, the act must have been commit-
ted within one year before the commencement of the debtor's own
case or during its pendency;73 and third, the debtor in the case in
which the act occurred must be an insider. 4
While the thrust of section 727(a)(7) is clear enough, it may
ADCO, Inc., 329 F.2d 362 (5th Cir. 1964); Schieffelin & Co. v. Harold, 222 F.2d 262 (2d Cr.
1955).
The Raphiel doctrine was amenable to application to conduct described in paragraphs
other than § 14c(1), because most of the grounds of objection to discharge under the Bank-
ruptcy Act-all but those prescribed by paragraphs (4), (5), and (8)-did not require the
objectionable conduct to occur in or in connection with the case in which the discharge issue
arose. Thus, a district court denied a discharge under § 14c(6) to a bankrupt who had re-
fused to answer a material question in the prior bankruptcy of a corporation of which he
was the president and sole stockholder. See In re Marcus, 149 F. Supp. 496, 497-500
(S.D.N.Y. 1957), afl'd, 253 F.2d 685 (2d Cir. 1958), discussed in Comment, Bank-
ruptcy-Individual Bankrupt Denied Discharge for Refusing to Testify in Corporation
Bankruptcy Proceeding, 43 IowA L. REv. 406 (1958). The objection to the discharge was
made by the trustee of the corporation, who had obtained a substantial judgment against
the bankrupt owner for debts arising out of his dealings with the corporation. On appeal the
court of appeals bypassed this ground of objection but affirmed the denial of discharge on
the ground that the debtor had obtained money by making a false statement respecting the
financial condition of his wholly owned corporation. In re Marcus, 253 F.2d 685, 687-88 (2d
Cir. 1958); cf. In re Sugarman, 3 F. Supp. 502, 506-07 (E.D.N.Y. 1933) (declining to sustain
an objection grounded on the bankrupt's refusal to answer questions in the bankruptcy of a
corporation in which he held a one-half interest).
In In re Cole, 88 F. Supp. 842 (E.D.N.Y. 1950), two bankrupts who had been the two
principal officers of a corporate debtor in a Chapter XI case were denied a discharge because
of their failure to keep adequate records after confirmation of an arrangement and because
of their having transferred and received property of the corporate debtor with intent to
defeat the Bankruptcy Act. Because the bankrupts were individually liable on the obliga-
tions of the corporate debtor and because these obligations remained unpaid when the indi-
viduals filed their bankruptcy petitions, the reasonable relationship requirement was easily
satisfied.
71. See Comment, supra note 70, at 409-10.
72. The acts specified in § 727 include the fraudulent disposition of or injury to prop-
erty of the debtor or the estate (§ 727(a)(2)), the failure to keep books (§ 727(a)(3)), the
making of a false claim or accepting a bribe for acting or forbearing to act (§ 727(a)(4)), the
failure to explain a loss or deficiency of assets (§ 727(a)(5)), and the refusal to answer a
material question or to obey a lawful order of the court (§ 727(a)(6)). 11 U.S.C. § 727 (1982).
73. 11 U.S.C. § 727(a)(7) (1982). Section 480(a)(2) of the Bankruptcy Amendments
and Federal Judgeship Act of 1984, Pub. L. No. 98-353, 98 Stat. 333, 382, amended
§ 727(a)(7) to make it applicable to the debtor's act committed in another case, whether
that case arose under the Bankruptcy Act or the Bankruptcy Code.
74. See supra note 68 for the Code's definition of "insider."
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present difficulties in application. The provision applies when a
partner is a debtor, but the act or conduct that gives rise to the
objection must occur in or in connection with the case of another
debtor who is an insider. Thus a partner's act or conduct involving
the insider's property, estate, financial affairs or condition, or busi-
ness transactions may be unavailable as a ground of objection to
the partner's discharge under section 727(a)(7) because the insider
was never a debtor in a case under Title 11. Even when the re-
quirement of two cases of related debtors is satisfied, there is am-
biguity in the statute whether the property, estate, financial affairs
or condition, or business transactions involved in the act or con-
duct must be those of the debtor whose discharge is at issue or
may be those of the insider.75 Relying on cases construing section
14c of the Bankruptcy Act,78 courts may find actions or conduct of
an insider sufficiently related to the partner's own property, condi-
tion, affairs, or transactions to sustain an objection to the partner's
discharge.
Interpretive problems arising in a partner's case under section
727 may be illustrated by a series of hypothetical situations:
(1) Suppose the debtor/partner, with intent to defraud a credi-
tor of the partnership of which he was a member, transferred or
concealed property of the partnership. An objection to the part-
ner's discharge can be based on section 727(a)(2) only if the debtor
has transferred or concealed his property. If the partnership be-
comes a debtor in a case under Title 11 within the time prescribed
by section 727(a)(7), has the debtor/partner committed an act con-
stituting a ground for an objection to discharge of the partner
under that provision? The debtor's act can be the basis for such an
objection only if the partnership property is regarded as property
of the debtor. While the partner does have a potential interest in
property of the partnership, that interest is quite tenuous when
the partnership is insolvent, as it is likely to be in this situation.
The logical difficulty presented by an objection to discharge of a
partner based on his transfer of partnership property was not even
considered, however, in cases denying a discharge under the Bank-
ruptcy Act to a partner participating in the transfer.7 7 Neverthe-
75. See supra note 59 and accompanying text.
76. See supra note 60 and accompanying text; infra notes 77, 84, and accompanying
text.
77. See Charles Edward & Assoc. v. England, 301 F.2d 572, 575 (9th Cir. 1962); In re
Richter, 57 F.2d 159, 161 (2d Cir. 1932). In Richter, discharge was denied to a partner who
withdrew partnership funds and applied them to personal expenditures, but was granted to
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less, an argument upholding the applicability of section 727(a) in
the supposititious situation might proceed as follows:
(a) Because the debtor has a contingent or potential interest
in the partnership property to the extent that a surplus may re-
main after the partnership obligations are paid, the separate credi-
tors of the partner should have standing to object to a concealment
or transfer that defeats or impairs that potential interest.
8
(b) Similarly, because the partnership's creditors are creditors
of the partner,7 9 they likewise have standing to object to his con-
cealment or transfer of partnership property to the prejudice of
their rights in such property.
(c) The act of the partner respecting the partnership property
under his control can be regarded as an act respecting his own
property by an extension of the cases assimilating the partner-
ship's financial condition to that of the partner for the purpose of
applying former section 14c(3) of the Bankruptcy Act.s0
Alternatively, the references to "debtor" in paragraphs (2) and
(7) of section 727(a) might refer to different persons. Thus, the
partner whose discharge is in question is the debtor who commit-
ted the act specified in section 727(a)(2), but the property trans-
ferred or concealed is that of the partnership estate being adminis-
tered in the insider's case. The word "debtor" thus is taken to
refer to the partner in section 727(a)(7) and the first time the term
is used in section 727(a)(2), but to refer to the partnership the sec-
ond time it is used in paragraph (2). The references in paragraph
(2) to "a creditor or an officer of the estate" and to "property of
the estate" must then specify a creditor, officer, and property of
the estate of the partnership. Mental acrobatics are required to
a partner who likewise withdrew partnership funds but applied them to effect a preferential
payment of a partnership obligation.
78. The partner's creditors' right to reach the partner's interest in the partnership
property is recognized in § 28 of the Uniform Partnership Act. For a discussion of creditors'
rights with respect to a partner's interest in partnership property, see J. CRANE & A. BRoM-
BERG, THE LAW OF PARTNERSHIP § 43 (1968).
79. See supra note 64 and accompanying text.
80. See supra note 60 and accompanying text. The force of the argument made in the
text should have been strongest when the claims of the nonpartnership creditors of the part-
ner exceeded the nonpartnership property of the partner but there was a surplus of partner-
ship property over partnership liabilities at the time of the partner's transfer or conceal-
ment of the partnership property. Cf. In re Jacob Berry & Co., 146 F. 623, 624 (S.D.N.Y.
1906) (indicating that a partner should be denied a discharge where a firm employee, acting
within the scope of his authority, made a fraudulent disposition of firm property), afl'd, 174
F. 409 (2d Cir. 1909).
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give any significant effect to the incorporation of paragraph (2)
into section 727(a)(7). Limiting the applicability of paragraph (7)'s
reference to paragraph (2) to fraudulent transfers or concealments
of the partner's own property would render the reference largely
nugatory and useless to reach the kind of conduct by a partner in
or in connection with a partnership case that is most likely to in-
jure or prejudice the partner's creditors.8'
(2) Assume that a partner has concealed or otherwise failed to
maintain information from which the partnership's financial condi-
tion or business transactions might be ascertained. If the partner-
ship becomes a debtor in a Title 11 case, a creditor may easily base
an objection on section 727(a)(7) by arguing that the partner has
committed an act specified in paragraph (3) of section 727(a) in
connection with another case concerning an insider.82 If the part-
nership does not become a debtor in a Title 11 case, however, an
objection to the discharge of the partner still can be predicated on
section 727(a)(3) by arguing that the debtor's concealment or fail-
ure to keep information respecting the partnership's financial con-
dition or business transactions constituted an act or failure re-
specting the partner's own condition or transactions.8 3 Again, case
law predating the Bankruptcy Reform Act points the way to a con-
struction sustaining a creditor's objection to the partner's
discharge.8
4
81. Similarly, intellectual agility may be required in order to enable the trustee of a
corporation to object to the discharge of an officer or other person in control on the ground
that such person transferred or concealed property of the corporation.
82. A partnership in which the debtor is a general partner is regarded as an "insider."
See 11 U.S.C. § 101(25)(A)(ii) (1982).
83. See Charles Edward & Assoc. v. England, 301 F.2d 572, 574 (9th Cir. 1962).
84. The courts did not acknowledge any difficulty in denying discharge to a partner
under § 14c(2) of the Bankruptcy Act when the partner failed to keep books of account or
records from which the financial condition and business transactions of the partnership
could be ascertained. See, e.g., Rameson Bros. v. Goggin, 241 F.2d 271, 275 (9th Cir. 1957);
In re Herzog, 121 F.2d 581, 582 (2d Cir. 1941), cert. denied, 315 U.S. 807 (1942); In re
Fineberg, 36 F.2d 392, 393 (W.D.N.Y. 1929); In re Currie, 23 AhL BANK REP. (MB) 539,
547-48 (Ref. E.D. Mich. 1910). The rights and liabilities of the partner that arise out of
partnership transactions or its financial condition suffice to justify the conclusion that an
act of omission or commission impairing the adequacy of the partnership records necessarily
hampers ascertainment of the financial condition of the partner. A partner who has no re-
sponsibility for the preparation and preservation of the partnership books and records has
frequently been granted a discharge, however, notwithstanding the inadequacy or unavaila-
bility of the partnership books of record. See, e.g., In re Livermore, 96 F.2d 93, 95 (2d Cir.
1938) (partner in Europe had no control of partnership books in New York); In re Poff, 211
F. Supp. 495, 497 (W.D. Va. 1962) (bankrupt had sold his interest in partnership before the
petition was filed and was unable to obtain partnership records from the purchaser); In re
Harrell, 263 F. 954, 956 (N.D. Ga. 1920) (partner was il and did not have knowledge of, or
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(3) Assume that a partner in or in connection with a Title 11
case concerning his partnership makes a false oath or account,
presents or uses a false claim, or gives or receives consideration for
an act or forbearance.85 The partner's act comes within section
727(a)(7) because the act would be in connection with another case
concerning an insider.8 6 If there is no Title 11 case including the
partnership, however, the partner's act would not satisfy section
727(a)(4) or (7) unless the false oath or other conduct, referred to
in one of the first three clauses of section 727(a)(4), is in or con-
nected with the partner's case."
(4) Suppose a partner withholds from a trustee of the partner-
ship recorded information relating to the partnership's property or
financial affairs. This act falls squarely within section 727(a)(7) if
the partnership is the "debtor" in the reference in section
727(a)(4)(D) to "the debtor's property or financial affairs." If the
partnership is not regarded as the debtor for this purpose, how-
ever, an act within section 727(a)(4)(D) cannot be found unless the
partnership's property or financial affairs are simply assimilated,
as in pre-Code law, to the property or affairs of the partner.
(5) If the partner fails to explain satisfactorily a loss of part-
nership assets or a deficiency of those assets to meet the partner-
ship's liabilities and the partnership is a debtor in a Title 11 case,
then the situation comes within section 727(a)(7). The partner's
conduct is a ground of objection, only if the partner can be the
actively participate in, conduct of partnership business).
When a partner has sought to escape the consequences of a failure to keep adequate
partnership records by alleging innocence or lack of participation in the failure, the courts
have placed the burden of proving such assertions on the partner seeking discharge. See,
e.g., Charles Edward & Assoc. v. England, 301 F.2d 572, 575 (9th Cir. 1962); In re Fineberg,
36 F.2d at 393; In re Schachter, 170 F. 683, 686 (S.D.N.Y. 1909); In re Currie, 23 Am. BANK.
REP. (MB) at 549. Bankruptcy Rule 4005, which places the burden of proof on the person
objecting to a discharge, does not necessarily overrule these cases. As the advisory commit-
tee note accompanying Rule 4005 explains, the provision leaves to the courts the formula-
tion of rules governing the burden of going forward with the evidence. See also Third Nat'l
Bank v. Trew (In re Trew), 23 COLLIER BANK& CAs. 2d (MB) 700, 703-05 (Bankr. M.D.
Tenn. 1980). The rule applied in all these cases may be viewed as shifting the burden of
going forward after the objector shows that there has been a failure to keep adequate part-
nership books.
85. These acts are listed in § 727(a)(4)(A), (B), and (C), and the introductory language
of paragraph (4) requires the acts to be committed "in or in connection with the case." 11
U.S.C. § 727 (1982).
86. As pointed out in supra note 82, a partnership in which the debtor is a general
partner is regarded as an insider.
87. The alternative rationales suggested in the text accompanying notes 80-87 may be
viewed as simple variants of a single argument. Either way the same result is reached-a
result that permits the drafters' purpose to be effectuated.
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"debtor" in his own case under paragraph (7) and in the insider's
case under paragraph (5) when he fails to explain, but the partner-
ship can be the debtor in the insider's case whose liabilities are not
met. The requirement of section 727(a)(5) that the failure to ex-
plain occur before determination of denial of discharge will not or-
dinarily cause difficulty since a partnership does not obtain a dis-
charge in a Chapter 7 case, and even in a Chapter 11 case there is
usually no determination of a denial of discharge.8 8 If the partner-
ship does not become a debtor under Title 11, the partner/debtor
cannot be guilty of failing to explain satisfactorily any loss or defi-
ciency within the literal language of section 727(a)(5), but as
pointed out earlier,89 there should be no difficulty in sustaining an
objection to the debtor's discharge grounded on that provision.
(6) Assume that a partner refuses in a partnership case to
obey a lawful order of the court or, without justification, refuses to
respond to a material question approved by the court. The part-
ner's act falls within section 727(a)(7), but only if the partnership
was a debtor in a Title 11 case within the time limits prescribed in
that paragraph.
As these hypothetical situations illustrate, if the debtor's
property, financial condition, financial affairs, or liabilities referred
to in paragraph (2), (3), (4), (5), or (6) of section 727(a) cannot
include the partnership's property, condition, affairs, or liabilities
when objection to a partner's discharge is based on paragraph (7),
the latter paragraph rarely will be of any use against a partner. A
stultifying construction of section 727(a)(7) can and should be
avoided by giving effect to the manifest purpose of the provision.
Similar, but distinguishable, problems arise when an objection
to the discharge of a debtor/partner under section 727(a)(7) is
based on his act in a case involving a copartner. A general partner
of the debtor is regarded as an insider,90 but treating a copartner's
property, financial condition, financial affairs, or liabilities as those
of the debtor for purposes of applying paragraph (7) involves a
leap of logic not warranted by any view of the relationship between
88. If confirmation of a plan is denied in a Chapter 11 case regarding a partnership
debtor, there might be a denial of discharge within the meaning of § 727(a)(5), but the
denial is not likely to have any relation to this Chapter 7 provision. Confirmation of a Chap-
ter 11 plan may not always constitute a discharge, see 11 U.S.C. § 1141(d)(3) (1982), but
even in that eventuality the court is unlikely to make a "determination of denial of dis-
charge" within § 727(a)(5) in a partnership case.
89. See supra note 64 and accompanying text.
90. See 11 U.S.C. § 101(25)(A)(iii) (1982).
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the partners. On the other hand, a partner's refusal to obey a law-
ful court order to testify in a case concerning a copartner may
ground an objection to the partner's discharge in his own case
under paragraph (7).91
Finally, a previous discharge is a ground of objection to a dis-
charge in a subsequent case under paragraph (7) or (8) of section
727(a), but only if the debtors in the two cases are the same.
B. Chapter 11 Cases
1. Discharge of a General Partner as a Debtor
Discharge in a Chapter 11 case is governed by section 1141
rather than section 727. An order confirming a Chapter 11 plan
discharges the debtor not only from prepetition debts but also
from any other debts that arise prior to confirmation. The scope of
the discharge of an individual partner is no broader in a case under
Chapter 11, however, than in a Chapter 7 case because the excep-
tions from discharge set out in section 523 apply equally to indi-
vidual partners under each chapter.9 2 On the other hand, a Chap-
ter 11 discharge of a corporate partner or a partnership that is
itself a partner is not subject to the exceptions to the scope of a
discharge prescribed in section 523.
The objections to discharge available under section 727 do not
ordinarily lie against the discharge that results from confirmation
of a plan of reorganization under Chapter 11. To forestall resort to
Chapter 11 as a means of circumventing section 727, however, the
grounds of objection specified in the section become available to a
Chapter 11 creditor when three conditions concur:
(1) the Chapter 11 plan provides for liquidation of all or sub-
stantially all of the debtor's property;
(2) the debtor does not engage in business after consummation
of the plan; and
(3) the debtor would be denied a discharge under section
727(a) if the debtor's case were administered under Chapter 7.93
An individual partner who would not be vulnerable to an ob-
jection to discharge in a Chapter 7 case may thus be discharged by
91. The partner's refusal may actually have occurred in a case concerning a co-
partner's relative and still constitute grounds for an objection to the debtor/partner's dis-
charge. See 11 U.S.C. § 101(25)(A)(i) (1982) (defining an "insider" to include a relative of a
general partner of the debtor).
92. See 11 U.S.C. § 1141(d)(2) (1982).
93. 11 U.S.C. § 1141(d)(3) (1982) (set out in supra note 11).
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virtue of a confirmation under Chapter 11, and it is immaterial
whether the confirmed plan is one of liquidation or of reorganiza-
tion and whether the debtor continues or terminates his business
after consummation. Moreover, it is immaterial whether the plan is
one proposed by the debtor, the creditors, or another party in in-
terest. Even if the individual debtor could not have obtained a dis-
charge in a Chapter 7 case because of an objection that might have
been made pursuant to section 727, the confirmation nevertheless
constitutes a discharge if the plan provides for a continuation
rather than a liquidation of the debtor's property. Indeed, it ap-
pears that if the individual debtor engages in business after con-
summation of the plan, the confirmation of even a liquidation plan
constitutes a discharge notwithstanding the availability of a
ground of objection under section 727 if the debtor's case had been
administered under Chapter 7.
As pointed out in connection with the discussion of the dis-
charge of a partnership,9 4 the Code does not specify the nature,
extent, or duration of the business operations required to be con-
ducted subsequent to consummation of the plan in order for the
debtor to save his discharge. To avoid frustrating the purpose of
section 1141(d)(3), however, an individual who could not have ob-
tained a discharge in a Chapter 7 case should not be able to obtain
discharge under Chapter 11 unless a discharge is necessary and ap-
propriate to protect a bona fide effort to reorganize a business or to
liquidate more advantageously for creditors than would have been
possible through a Chapter 7 liquidation. 5
94. See supra text accompanying notes 11-14.
95. The drafters of § 1141(d)(3)(B), which sets out the debtor's lack of business activ-
ity after consummation of the plan as one of the conditions required in order for the section
727 grounds of objection to be available in a Chapter 11 case, presumably intended or as-
sumed that the clause would not be satisfied if the debtor continues some aspect of the
former business for at least a significant period of time. If the individual does continue the
business after consummation, the confirmation of the plan would discharge his debts as
provided in § 1141(d). Presumably, subsequent death, illness, or retirement from the busi-
ness will not revive the debts once discharged by the confirmation. For reasons indicated in
supra note 14 and accompanying text, postconfirmation creditors relying in good faith on
the effectiveness of the confirmation, as well as the debtor himself, should be protected by
the discharge.
If an individual could avoid the hurdles presented by § 727(a) simply by engaging in
some business activity after a Chapter 11 liquidation, well-advised individuals seeking
debtor relief under the Bankruptcy Code could be expected routinely to file petitions under
Chapter 11. Such a development would undoubtedly trigger litigation challenging the good
faith of Chapter 11 petitions filed by individual debtors. The exploitation of Chapter 11 as a
pathway around § 727(a) could be curbed, of course, by court dismissals of Chapter 11 peti-
tions filed for such a purpose.
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If a corporate partner or a partnership that is a partner is the
debtor in a confirmed Chapter 11 plan, the confirmation consti-
tutes a discharge if the confirmed plan provides for a reorganiza-
tion rather than a liquidation or if the debtor engages in business
after the consummation of a liquidation plan. In either event it is
immaterial whether the debtor committed an act that would have
constituted an objection to discharge under section 727(a). If the
debtor/partner could not have obtained a discharge under section
727, however, the partner would not be discharged by the confir-
mation of a Chapter 11 plan of liquidation unless it continued in
business after consummation of the plan.
As the discussion of the discharge of a partnership showed, the
Bankruptcy Code is silent regarding the effects of a default in an
executory provision of a confirmed plan or of any other event that
might terminate the plan. 6 The conclusion that the discharge
should be deemed unaffected by the default or termination is as
applicable to the confirmation of a plan for an individual debtor as
to the confirmation of a partnership plan. As was pointed out in
the discussion of the discharge of a partnership in a Chapter 11
case, however, judicial qualifications may be engrafted or the dis-
charge effected by the confirmation of a Chapter 11 plan.9 7
2. Discharge of a General Partner as an Incident to Discharge
of the Partnership
The Bankruptcy Act provided that the discharge of a partner-
ship did not discharge a member of the partnership.98 The partner
was generally required to become an adjudicated bankrupt or a pe-
titioner in a Chapter XI, XII, or XIII case in order to obtain the
benefit of a discharge. 9  The Bankruptcy Code, on the other hand,
96. See supra text accompanying notes 15-24.
97. See supra text accompanying notes 32-33.
98. Bankruptcy Act § 5j. The first sentence of § 5j, added by the Chandler Act of 1938,
settled a conflict in the cases as to whether a discharge of a partnership operated to release
the individual partners from firm debts. 1A COLLIER ON BANKuprcy 115.15, at 717 (J. Moore
14th ed. 1974). The Supreme Court held in Myers v. International Trust Co., 273 U.S. 380,
382-85 (1927), that the discharge of a partnership did not release partners from liability on
their personal endorsements on notes given to partnership creditors but refrained from rul-
ing on the effect of a partnership discharge on the liabilities of the partners to partnership
creditors in the absence of any personal guaranty or assumption of the separate obligation.
See generally Note, The Effect of a Discharge of a Partner or a Partnership in Bank-
ruptcy, 5 TEX. L. REv. 400 (1927) (discussing Myers).
99. See, e.g., Acme Tool, Inc. v. Flesher (In re Rogers-Fain Drilling Co.), 309 F.2d 636
(10th Cir. 1962); Schram v. Perkins, 38 F. Supp. 404 (E.D. Mich. 1941); Larson v. Morris
Black & Sons, Inc. (In re Carver House), 5 BANIK CT. DEc. (CRR) 1193, 1194-95 (Bankr.
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contains no language purporting to deal with the effect of a part-
nership discharge on the liability of the partners. Section 1141(d),
however, limits the discharge effected by confirmation of a plan to
the debtor, and the "debtor" is defined in section 101(12) to be a
person concerning whom a case under Title 11 has been com-
menced. Moreover, section 524(e) declares that "discharge of a
debt of the debtor does not affect the liability of any other entity
on, or the property of any other entity for, such debt." Accord-
ingly, it is not surprising that efforts by sureties and other co-obli-
gors to obtain the benefits of a discharge without having been
"debtors" themselves have been generally unavailing. 100 Declara-
tions that the bankruptcy court has no power to discharge a debt
of an entity that is not a debtor under the Code are frequently
encountered in judicial opinions.101 Two cases decided under the
Bankruptcy Act warrant a closer examination of this statement of
the prevailing law.
E.D. Pa. 1979); see also First Nat'l Bank v. Poland Union, 109 F.2d 54 (2d Cir.), cert. de-
nied, 309 U.S. 682 (1940).
In Poland Union the court declined to approve the issuance of a perpetual injunction
against the filing of suits by the creditors of an unincorporated association to collect their
claims against the members of the association. Although the court acknowledged that no
plan of reorganization for the association was practicable unless suits against the sharehold-
ers were perpetually restrained, the court declared that such relief, which would have been
tantamount to a discharge of the members without an administration of their separate es-
tates, was beyond the court's power. The association was identified as a partnership in its
articles of association, but the court observed that its legal status had never been deter-
mined. 109 F.2d at 55-56.
100. Courts have given short shrift to arguments that seek to predicate discharge of
the nondebtor obligor on participation of the creditor or obligor in the debtor's case, on
waiver or estoppel, or on a broad construction of the discharge provisions in the debtor's
plan or the order of confirmation. See United States v. Stribling Flying Serv., 734 F.2d 221,
223-24 (5th Cir. 1984) (rejecting arguments that creditor was barred from pursuing guaran-
tor by the restructuring and reduction of the debt in the debtor's plan confirmed in a Chap-
ter 11 case, by collateral estoppel, and by res judicata); Beconta, Inc. v. Schneider, 587 F.
Supp. 1024 (E.D. Mich. 1984) (alteration of debtor's liability by confirmed Chapter 11 plan
to 30% of allowed amount of creditors' claims held not to alter guarantor's liability); United
States v. Kurtz, 525 F. Supp. 734, 741-44 (E.D. Pa. 1981) (rejecting arguments that credi-
tor's participation in debtor's Chapter XI case worked an estoppel and accord and satisfac-
tion with respect to a guarantor's liability for unpaid deficiencies), aff'd per curiam, 688
F.2d 827 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 459 U.S. 991 (1982); United States v. George A. Fuller Co.,
250 F. Supp. 649, 656-58 (D. Mont. 1966) (participation by creditor in debtor's Chapter XI
case and general language of settlement embodied in confirmed plan held not to relieve
sureties on Miller Act bond).
101. See, e.g., Union Carbide Corp. v. Newboles, 686 F.2d 593, 595 (7th Cir. 1982);
R.I.D.C. Indus. Dev. Fund v. Snyder, 539 F.2d 487, 490 n.3 (5th Cir. 1976), cert. denied, 429
U.S. 1095 (1977); United States v. George A. Fuller Co., 250 F. Supp. 649, 656 (D. Mont.
1966).
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The first case, Levy v. Cohen,10 2 arose from a collateral attack
by a partnership creditor on a bankruptcy court order confirming
the partnership's Chapter XII plan that had expressly released the
partners from liability on the partnership debts even though the
partners were not debtors in the Chapter XII case. The objecting
creditor did not timely file a proof of claim and received no distri-
bution under the plan, but he did receive notice of the meeting at
which confirmation of the debtor's plan was considered.103 Al-
though the court's statement of the facts does not reveal whether
the notice gave warning of a proposed release of the partners, the
court emphasized that the objecting creditors who did not appear
at the meeting had an opportunity to object to the bankruptcy
court's jurisdiction to discharge the partners.1 04 When the ob-
102. 19 Cal. 3d 165, 561 P.2d 252, 137 Cal. Rptr. 162, cert. denied, 434 U.S. 833 (1977).
103. Id. at 174, 561 P.2d at 258, 137 Cal. Rptr. at 168. The objecting creditor likely did
not file an acceptance of the plan, but the opinion does not state whether the creditor voted
on the plan.
104. Id. at 173-74, 561 P.2d at 257-58, 137 Cal. Rptr. at 167-68. In evaluating a collat-
eral attack on an order of the bankruptcy court grounded on lack of jurisdiction, it is neces-
sary to distinguish between jurisdiction of the subject matter and jurisdiction of the person.
Under the Bankruptcy Act, a bankruptcy court clearly had jurisdiction to grant a discharge
to a partner even though only the partnership was a debtor in the case. See Stoll v. Gottlieb,
305 U.S. 165, 172 (1938) (Supreme Court upholding cancellation of a guaranty of an obliga-
tion of a debtor in an order confirming a plan filed by the principal debtor under § 77B). In
Stoll the jurisdiction of the subject matter had been litigated in the bankruptcy court on a
motion to vacate the order of confirmation, and the objector's motion had been denied. Id.
at 169. Two years later, in Chicot County Drainage Dist. v. Baxter State Bank, 308 U.S. 371
(1940), the Court rejected a collateral attack on a decree confirming a plan under former
Chapter IX notwithstanding that the chapter had been held unconstitutional in other litiga-
tion intervening between the entry of the challenged decree and the collateral attack. The
Supreme Court ruled that the fact that there had been no litigation of the constitutional
and jurisdictional issues in the court in which the challenged confirmation order had been
entered was immaterial; "res judicata may be pleaded as a bar, not only as respects matters
actually presented to sustain or defeat the right asserted in the earlier proceeding, 'but also
as respects any other available matter which might have been presented to that end."' 308
U.S. at 378 (quoting Grubb v. Public Util. Comm'n, 281 U.S. 470, 479 (1930)); see also
Moore, Res Judicata and Collateral Estoppel in Bankruptcy, 68 YALE L.J. 1, 3, 7-10 (1958);
Note, Filling the Void: Judicial Power and Jurisdictional Attacks on Judgments, 87 YALE
L.J. 164, 180 (1977).
The ruling in Levy and the implications of Stoll and Chicot County Drainage were
ignored in Union Carbide Corp. v. Newboles, 686 F.2d 593 (7th Cir. 1982). In Newboles, a
creditor was allowed to enforce a corporate obligation against the corporation's president as
a guarantor notwithstanding the creditor's approval of a provision in a confirmed Chapter
XI plan that discharged the president as well as the corporation. See also R.I.D.C. Indus.
Dev. Fund v. Snyder, 539 F.2d 487, 490 n.3 (5th Cir. 1976) (declaring in dicta that a bank-
ruptcy court has no power to affect the obligation of a guarantor of a Chapter XI debtor's
indebtedness), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 1095 (1977).
Whether an order of a bankruptcy judge purporting to discharge a partner in a Chapter
11 case involving only the partnership would be sustained today depends on the finality
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jecting creditor thereafter sought to collect the unpaid portion of
his claim from the partners by suing them in state court, the bank-
ruptcy court's order discharging the partners was held to be res
judicata
10 5
accorded orders of bankruptcy judges under the Bankruptcy Amendments and Federal
Judgeship Act of 1984, Pub. L. No. 98-353, 98 Stat. 333. When there has been a reference
pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 157(a), section 157(b) appears to confer jurisdiction on a bank-
ruptcy judge to enter final orders in hearings on confirmation (D(2)(L)), objections to dis-
charge (D(2)(J)), and proceedings to determine the dischargeability of debts (D(2)(I)). 98
Stat. at 340 (to be codified at 28 U.S.C. § 157). The language of § 157(b) does not require
straining to regard an order of confirmation of a partnership plan that discharges the part-
ners as well as the partnership from partnership debts as one entered in a core proceeding.
The 1984 amendments and accompanying legislative history make sense only on the as-
sumption that the bankruptcy court's jurisdiction and orders entered in core proceedings,
including those listed in the three enumerated subparagraphs, are to be accorded the same
respect as orders entered by the bankruptcy court in the exercise of summary jurisdiction
under the Bankruptcy Act. The Supreme Court never explicitly faced the question whether
the bankruptcy court's summary jurisdiction rested on a constitutional base. Justice Bren-
nan observed in Northern Pipeline Constr. Co. v. Marathon Pipe Line Co., 458 U.S. 50, 79
n.31 (1982), that the "adjunct functions" of the referees in bankruptcy "have never been
explicitly endorsed by this Court," but, as Justice White pointed out in Katchen v. Landy,
382 U.S. 323, 328 (1966), the summary jurisdiction of the bankruptcy court under the Bank-
ruptcy Act was largely fashioned by the Supreme Court itself. It would have ill behooved
the Court that permitted and shaped the development of the bankruptcy court's summary
jurisdiction over the course of 80 years to declare the institution for which it bore such
responsibility to be constitutionally unsound.
The constitutionality of both the structure established by 28 U.S.C. §§ 157, 158, and
1334 as amended and the allocation of jurisdiction to the units of the structure raises new
questions, and it is not at all clear that the lines drawn by the legislation enacted on July 10,
1984, have a constitutional legitimacy superior to those formulated and applied during the
regime of the Bankruptcy Act. If the substance of due process is to prevail over form, how-
ever, the orders entered in core proceedings ought to be accorded no less finality and respect
than those that are entered in related proceedings.
In any event, the proposition was clear under the Bankruptcy Act, as it is under the
Bankruptcy Reform Act and the Bankruptcy Amendments and Federal Judgeship Act, that
any creditor of the partnership who did not get notice of the proposed order to discharge
the partners with an opportunity to raise timely objections would have a legitimate ground
for attacking the confirmation order under the fifth amendment. His right of recovery
against the partners would have been taken away without due process. See Note, supra, at
188, 210; see also supra notes 32-33 and accompanying text.
105. Levy, 19 Cal. 3d at 173, 561 P.2d at 257, 137 Cal. Rptr. at 167; see also Schraer v.
G.A.C. Fin. Corp., 408 F.2d 891, 895 (6th Cir. 1969) (holding that a Chapter XII plan re-
leasing a surety on the debtor's obligation was binding on a creditor who had approved the
plan); cf. City Loan and Sav. Co. v. Betts (In re Betts), 8 Bankr. 799, 801 (Bankr. S.D. Ohio
1981) (creditor barred from obtaining relief from automatic stay prescribed by § 1301 by
provision in confirmed Chapter 13 plan, not objected to by creditor, that prohibited collec-
tion from a codebtor until completion of payments under the debtor's plan or until dismis-
sal of the case). But see In re Neyland & McKeithen, 184 F. 144, 149-50 (S.D. Miss. 1910)
(treating purported discharge of partners as surplusage when only the partnership was adju-
dicated-the result being to eliminate the six-year bar to a discharge in a subsequent case
involving another partnership with a common partner); Curlee Clothing Co. v. Hamn, 160
Ark. 483, 486, 254 S.W. 818, 818 (1923) (disregarding as "surplusage" language in an order
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The second case, Consolidated Motor Inns v. B.V.A. Credit
Corp. (In re Consolidated Motor Inns),10 6 required two trips to the
Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit before a final disposition
was obtained. The original order of confirmation of a Chapter XII
plan had barred claims of 400 creditors of the debtor partnership
against the partners and their spouses, and the distribution checks
required the payees to release the debtor, the partners, and their
spouses. On appeal, the district court reversed on the ground that
the partners had no standing in the partnership's case to receive a
discharge. An appeal from the district court judgment to the court
of appeals was dismissed over the objection of the debtor to the
failure of the court of appeals to vacate the judgment of the dis-
trict court, and the Supreme Court denied certiorari.10 7 On remand
to the bankruptcy court the discharge of the partners was voided,
and the district court affirmed. On second appeal, the court of ap-
peals reversed the district court on the ground that its avoidance
of the partners' discharge would frustrate the congressional pur-
pose to enable partners to obtain a fresh start under Chapter
XII.o 8 A creditor who had not, consented to the plan obtained an
en banc reconsideration of this second ruling of the court of ap-
peals. By a final vote of 12 to 2, the district court judgment was
affirmed insofar as it held the confirmation inoperative to dis-
charge claims of "nonassenting creditors" against the partners and
their spouses.109
Although Levy v. Cohen was not cited or apparently even con-
sidered by the Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit, the final re-
sults of the two cases are entirely reconcilable: a partner may be
discharged by the confirmation of a plan in a case commenced by
confirming a composition of a partnership's debts that purported to discharge individual
members of the firm from their liability for partnership and individual debts, because the
order was broader than the record warranted).
106. 632 F.2d 1178 (5th Cir. 1980), vacated on petition for en banc reconsideration,
666 F.2d 189, cert. denied, 457 U.S. 1140 (1982).
107. 632 F.2d at 1180. The Supreme Court denied certiorari on the first appeal in
Consolidated Motor Inns v. Alias Enter., 436 U.S. 935 (1978).
108. 632 F.2d at 1183. The court of appeals held § 5(j) of the Bankruptcy Act, requir-
ing a partner to be separately adjudged a bankrupt in order to be discharged from partner-
ship debts, to be inconsistent with Chapter XII and therefore rendered inapplicable in a
Chapter XII case by § 402 of the Bankruptcy Act. Id. The court feebly distinguished the
ruling to the contrary in Acme Tool, Inc. v. Flesher, 309 F.2d 636 (10th Cir. 1962), but
acknowledged that it found the "general comment" in Flesher as to the applicability of §
5(j) in a Chapter XII case to be "unpersuasive." 632 F.2d at 1183 n.6. The court stated that
it was unaware of any other case addressing the issue, id., and made no reference to the
Carber House, Poland Union, and Levy cases cited in supra notes 99 and 102.
109. 666 F.2d at 191.
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or against a partnership if the plan provides for such a discharge,
but the confirmation does not operate to discharge claims against
the partners held by creditors who did not accept the plan and
who take timely steps to preserve their rights against the partners.
Levy indicates that withholding consent to the plan may not suf-
fice to save the partnership creditor's'rights against the partners;
timely objection to confirmation in the bankruptcy court is re-
quired. The Consolidated Motor Inns case, on the other hand, il-
lustrates that neither the votes of other creditors nor the power of
the bankruptcy court to confirm a plan over the objections of cred-
itors can operate to release an objecting partnership creditor's
claim against a partner in a partnership case. Finally, both Levy
and Consolidated Motor Inns reveal the possibility that some, but
not all, partnership creditors' claims against partners may be dis-
charged by the operation of waiver and res judicata.110 The rulings
in both cases appear to be entirely compatible with the Bank-
ruptcy Code.
C. Chapter 13 Cases
Although a partner may be an eligible petitioner in a Chapter
13 case,"1 it is not a likely possibility. Nevertheless, a partner who
can meet the requirements of section 109(3), propose a plan meet-
ing the requirements of section 1325, obtain confirmation of his
plan, and complete payments under the plan is entitled to a dis-
charge as provided under section 1328(a) of Title 11. The discharge
operates for all debts provided for under the plan,"12 including
debts owed to partnership creditors, with two exceptions:
(1) any debt becoming due after the date on which the last payment
under the plan is due; and
(2) any obligation to a spouse or child for alimony, maintenance, or
110. The final opinion in the Consolidated Motor Inns case did not indicate any in-
tent to disturb the effect of the confirmation as a discharge of the claims of the assenting
creditors against the partners. 666 F.2d at 191.
111. See Kennedy, supra note 19, at 513.
112. Chapter 13 does not explicitly define what debts may be provided for in a plan.
Claims that may be allowed in a Chapter 13 case include not only prepetition claims but
also two classes of postpetition claims: (1) claims for taxes that become payable during the
pendency of the case; and (2) claims for-property or services necessary for the debtor's per-
formance of the plan. 11 U.S.C. Id. §-305(a) (1982). The second class of claims is subject to
disallowance, however, if the claimant knew or should have known that obtaining the trus-
tee's prior approval of the incurring of the debt was practicable, and such approval was not
obtained. Id. § 1305(c). Debts may be deemed to be provided for in a Chapter 13 plan
although no payment of the debts is required to be made by the plan. See In re Gregory,




Notably, only one of the exceptions to the effect of a discharge
granted in a Chapter 7 case applies to the discharge granted to a
Chapter 13 debtor under section 1328(a). If a debtor does not com-
plete the payments under a confirmed Chapter 13 plan because of
circumstances for which the debtor is not responsible, the debtor
may nevertheless obtain a discharge under section 1328(b). Two
additional requisites, however, must be satisfied: distributions
under the plan must equal or exceed in value what would have
been distributable to the creditors in a Chapter 7 liquidation on
the effective date of the plan; and modification of the plan pursu-
ant to section 1329 must be impracticable.
A discharge obtainable under section 1322(b), like a discharge
under section 1322(a), does not affect debts that become due after
the last payment under the plan is due but, unlike a discharge
under section 1322(a), is subject to all the exceptions specified in
section 523(a).114 A discharge of a Chapter 13 debtor under either
section 1327(a) or section 1328(b), however, does not discharge any
postpetition consumer debt, even though allowed under section
1305(a)(2) as debt incurred for property or services necessary for
the debtor's performance under the plan, unless prior approval by
the trustee was either obtained or was impracticable to obtain.1 5
II. DisCHARGEABILITY OF DEBTS OF GENERAL PARTNERS
Section 523(a) contains a list of ten exceptions to discharge.11 6
The list includes most of the exceptions set out in section 17a of
113. 11 U.S.C. § 1328(a) (1982).
114. See infra note 116 for the text of § 523(a).
115. 11 U.S.C. § 1328(d) (1982). Section 1305(b) and (c) apparently authorize the al-
lowance of a claim for a postpetition consumer debt incurred for property or services neces-
sary for the debtor's performance under the plan although the trustee did not approve the
incurring of the debt if the creditor did not know and was not chargeable with knowing that
the trustee's approval was required and obtainable. Section 1328(d), however, precludes dis-
charge of such a claim if prior approval by the trustee was nevertheless obtainable but was
not obtained.
116. 11 U.S.C. § 523(a) (1982), as amended by the Bankruptcy Amendments and Fed-
eral Judgeship Act of 1984, Pub. L. No. 98-353, 98 Stat. 333, 353, 364, provides:
(a) A discharge under section 727, 1141, or 1328(b) of this title does not discharge
an individual debtor from any debt -
(1) for a tax or customs duty -
(A) of the kind and for the periods specified in section 507(a)(2) or
507(a)(6) [should be "507(a)(7)"] of this title, whether or not a claim for
such tax was filed or allowed:
(B) with respectto which a return, if required -
(i) was not filed; or
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(ii) was filed after the date on which such return was last due,
under applicable law or under any extension, and after two years
before the date of the filing of the petition; or
(C) with respect to which the debtor made a fraudulent return or will-
fully attempted in any manner to evade or defeat such tax;
(2) for money, property, services, or an extension, renewal, or refinancing of
credit, to the extent obtained by -
(A) false pretenses, a false representation, or actual fraud, other than a
statement respecting the debtor's or an insider's financial condition;
(B) use of a statement in writing -
(i) that is materially false;
(ii) respecting the debtor's or an insider's financial condition;
(iii) on which the creditor to whom the debtor is liable for ob-
taining such money, property, services, or credit reasonably relied;
and
(iv) that the debtor caused to be made or published with intent
to deceive; or
(C) for purposes of subparagraph (A) of this paragraph, consumer
debts owed to a single creditor and aggregating more than $500 for 'luxury
goods or services' incurred by an individual debtor on or within forty days
before the order for relief under this title, or cash advances aggregating
more than $1,000 that are extensions of consumer credit under an open end
credit plan obtained by an individual debtor on or within twenty days
before the order for relief under this title, are presumed to be nondis-
chargeable; 'luxury goods or services' do not include goods or services rea-
sonably acquired for the support or maintenance of the debtor or a depen-
dent of the debtor; an extension of consumer credit under an open credit
plan is to be defined for purposes of this subparagraph as it is defined in
the Consumer Credit Protection Act (15 U.S.C. 1601 et seq.);
(3) neither listed nor scheduled under section 521(1) of this title, with the
name, if known to the debtor, of the creditor to whom such debt is owed, in time
to permit -
(A) if such debt is not of a kind specified in paragraph (2), (4), or (6) of
this subsection, timely filing of a proof of claim, unless such creditor had
notice or actual knowledge of the case in time for such timely filing; or
(B) if such debt is of a kind specified in paragraphs (2), (4), or (6) of
this subsection, timely filing of a proof of claim and timely request for a
determination of dischargeability of such debt under one of such
paragraphs, unless such creditor had notice or actual knowledge of the case
in time for such timely filing and request;
(4) for fraud or defalcation while acting in a fiduciary capacity, embezzlement,
or larceny;
(5) to a spouse, former spouse, or child of the debtor, for alimony to, mainte-
nance for, or support of such spouse or child, in connection with a separation
agreement, divorce decree, or other order of a court of record, property settlement
agreement, but not to the extent that -
(A) such debt is assigned to another entity, voluntarily, by operation of
law, or otherwise (other than debts assigned pursuant to section 402(a)(26)
of the Social Security Act; or any such debt which has been assigned to the
Federal Government or to a State or any political subdivision of such
State); or
(B) such debt includes a liability designated as alimony, maintenance,
or support, unless such liability is actually in the nature of alimony, main-
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the Bankruptcy Act, 1 17 and the case law construing section 17a
tenance, or support;
(6) for willful and malicious injury by the debtor to another entity or to the
property of another entity;
(7) to the extent such debt is for a fine, penalty, or forfeiture payable to and
for the benefit of a governmental unit, and is not compensation for actual pecuni-
ary loss, other than a tax penalty -
(A) relating to a tax of a kind not specified in paragraph (1) of this
subsection; or
(B) imposed with respect to a transaction or event that occurred before
three years before the date of filing of the petition;
(8) for an educational loan, made, insured, or guaranteed by a governmental
unit, or made under any program funded in whole or in part by a governmental
unit or a nonprofit institution, unless -
(A) such loan first became due before five years (exclusive of any appli-
cable suspension of the repayment period) before the date of the filing of
the petition; or
(B) excepting such debt from discharge under this paragraph will im-
pose an undue hardship on the debtor and the debtor's dependents;
(9) to any entity to the extent that such debt arises from a judgment or con-
sent decree entered in a court of record against the debtor wherein liability was
incurred by such debtor as a result of the debtor's operation of a motor vehicle
while legally intoxicated under the laws or regulations of any jurisdiction within
the United States or the territories wherein such motor vehicle was operated and
within which such liability was incurred; or
(9) [should be redesignated as "(10)"] that was or could have been listed or
scheduled by the debtor in a prior case concerning the debtor under this title or
under the Bankruptcy Act in which the debtor waived discharge, or was denied a
discharge under section 727(a)(2), (3), (4), (5), (6), or (7) of this title or under
section 14c(1), (2), (3), (4), (6), or (7) of such Act.
117. Following is a table of rough correspondence between the paragraphs of former
§ 17a and Bankruptcy Code § 523(a):
§ 17a § 523(a)
(1) (1)








(9) (should be (8)
"(10)")
As indicated in the chart, there are no counterparts in the Code for § 17a(5), excepting
certain debts or wages and commissions, and § 17a(6), excepting debts of employers arising
out of bonds given by employees to secure their employment obligations. Section 523(a)(7),
excepting noncompensatory fines, penalties, and forfeitures payable to or for the benefit of
governmental units, and the first paragraph designated as "523(a)(9)," excepting a liability
that results from driving a motor vehicle while intoxicated, are new. The second of the
paragraphs designated as § 523(a)(9) is an adaptation of the second sentence of § 17b of the
Bankruptcy Act.
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continues to be persuasive, if not controlling, in the application of
the corresponding exceptions in section 523(a) of the Bankruptcy
Code. Congress included a liability resulting from operation of a
motor vehicle while intoxicated as a new exception in the Bank-
ruptcy Amendments and Federal Judgeship Act of 1984118 and also
added a presumption that certain consumer debts incurred on the
eve of the entry of the order for relief are nondischargeable. 119 The
scope of section 523(a) is considerably narrower than that of for-
mer section 17a, and that difference must be borne in mind in as-
sessing the current relevance and weight of the cases decided
under the Bankruptcy Act. The exceptions of section 523(a) apply
to all discharges obtained by individual debtors under the Code,
including partners, except discharges obtained on completion of
payments under confirmed Chapter 13 plans. 120 On the other hand,
section 523(a) does not apply to cases in which partnerships or cor-
porate partners are debtors. A partnership or a corporate partner
cannot obtain a discharge of any debts in a case under Chapter 7,
but confirmation of a Chapter 11 plan ordinarily constitutes a
comprehensive discharge of a corporate or partnership debtor un-
diminished by any of the exceptions of section 523(a).121
The application of section 523(a) in a case involving an indi-
vidual partner presents few special problems. 12 2 Debts owed to
118. Pub. L. No. 98-353, § 371, 98 Stat. 333, 364.
119. Id. § 307(a)(3), 98 Stat. at 353-54.
120. An individual debtor, including a partner, may obtain a discharge under § 1328(a)
from all but two classes of debts on completing payments under a Chapter 13 plan. See
supra text accompanying note 113.
121. Confirmation of a Chapter 11 plan does not constitute a discharge of any debts if
the three conditions specified in § 1141(d)(3) concur. See supra notes 11-14, 93-95, and
accompanying text. Section 1141(d)(1) also recognizes that discharge in a Chapter 11 case
may be qualified by a provision in the plan or order of confirmation. See supra note 26 and
accompanying text.
122. Creditors unsuccessfully argued in Horner v. Hamner, 249 F. 134 (4th Cir. 1918),
that the failure of a partnership to apply for and obtain a discharge in a previous bank-
ruptcy case precluded a member of the partnership from obtaining a discharge in his subse-
quent bankruptcy. The Bankruptcy Code includes in § 523(a)(9) a codification of the rule
that excepts from the operation of a discharge any debt that was dischargeable but was not
discharged in a prior case concerning the same debtor. Although a partnership is no longer
eligible for a discharge in a liquidation case, the issue presented in Homer could arise if a
partnership failed to obtain a discharge in a prior Chapter 11 case. In such an event the
Homer rationale remains viable and should enable the partner to obtain a discharge from
the partnership debts as well as his nonpartnership debts.
In Paro v. Tetzlaff (In re Tetzlaff), 44 Bankr. 177 (Bankr. E.D. Wis. 1984), a copartner
of a debtor/partner sought to have his claims for fraud and contribution against the debtor
arising out of participation in the partnership business excepted from the debtor's discharge
under § 523(a)(2) and (4). Relief was denied for failure of the complainant's evidence to
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partnership creditors are generally dischargeable to the same ex-
tent and in the same way as debts owed to nonpartnership credi-
tors. 2 3 As under the Bankruptcy Act the partner must ordinarily
schedule partnership debts properly, along with the nonpartner-
ship debts, in order to obtain a full discharge. 124 Notwithstanding
the partner's failure properly to list or schedule a debt, however,
the debt may be discharged if the creditor holding the claim re-
ceived notice or otherwise had knowledge of the partner's case in
time to file a proof of claim and a request for determination of
dischargeability.
12 5
A problem analogous to one that arises more often under sec-
tion 727 is presented when a creditor of a partnership seeks a de-
termination of nondischargeability in a partner's case on the basis
of a false representation respecting the partnership's financial con-
dition. 26 The partner/debtor may contend that section 523(a)(2)
does not apply because he did not obtain any money, property, or
credit as a result of the representation, and because he made no
representation respecting his financial condition. The second con-
tention is anticipated and neutralized by explicit language in sec-
tion 523(a)(2) that makes a false representation respecting an in-
sider's financial condition as much a basis for nondischargeability
as is a representation respecting the debtor's own financial condi-
tion. An "insider's financial condition" includes that of the
debtor's partnership and, indeed, the financial condition of each
support his allegations.
123. See In re Russell, 97 F. 32 (N.D. Iowa 1899) (vacating an adjudication of a part-
ner on his voluntary petition under the Bankruptcy Act for failure to allege his membership
in a partnership and to request a discharge from partnership and individual creditors).
124. 11 U.S.C. § 523(a)(3) (1982). Section 521(1) requires the debtor to file a list of
creditors and, unless the court orders otherwise, a schedule of liabilities. Bankruptcy Rule
1007 governs the filing of the list and the schedule. Proper listing and scheduling require
that the name and address of each creditor known to the debtor be included so that timely
notice of the creditors' meeting and other needful information can be given. Although Rule
1007 generally requires the listing and scheduling to be accomplished within 15 days of the
entry of the order for relief, extensions are authorized, and a creditor cannot complain of a
delay in the listing or scheduling unless the creditor is thereby prevented from filing a
timely proof of claim or request for determination of dichargeability. The creditor is al-
lowed, by Rule 3002(c), at least 90 days after the first date set for the first meeting of
creditors in which to file a proof of claim in a Chapter 7 or Chapter 13 case, but the time
allowed in a Chapter 11 case is left to the discretion of the court by Rule 3003(c)(3). There
is no time limit on the filing of a request for determination of the dischargeability of a claim
unless the creditor seeks a determination of dischargeability under paragraph (2), (4), or (6)
of § 523(a). Rule 4007(c) requires a complaint requesting such a determination to be filed
ordinarily within 60 days after the first date set for the first meeting of creditors.
125. See supra note 124.
126. See supra notes 60-62 and accompanying text.
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general partner of the debtor and of the relatives of each such
partner.12 7 The first contention is not so easily disposed of by ref-
erence to the language of the provision, but section 17a(2) of the
Bankruptcy Act, the predecessor of section 523(a)(2) of the Code
and which contains similar language, was uniformly construed to
render a liability nondischargeable although the money, property,
or credit obtained by the false representation was intended for an-
other. e12  The same construction has been given to the similar lan-
guage in section 523(a)(8).2 9
As previously noted, a partner's discharge is not ordinarily de-
nied because of conduct of a copartner in which the debtor/partner
personally was not involved. 130 When the issue is whether a co-
partner's conduct may render the liability of a debtor/partner on a
partnership debt nondischargeable, however, a contrasting result is
frequently encountered. Thus a partnership debt has been held
nondischargeable with respect to all partners when money or prop-
erty was obtained by the partnership by false pretenses or false
representations-the fraudulent conduct of one partner being at-
tributed to the other partners.1 31 Likewise a willful and malicious
conversion of property of another committed by one partner in the
ordinary course of the partnership business has been held to create
127. 11 U.S.C. § 101(25)(A) (1982).
128. See, e.g., In re Kunkle, 40 F.2d 563 (E.D. Mich. 1930) (section 17a(2) applied to a
debtor who had obtained money on behalf of others for whom he acted as agent); McCloud
v. Woods, 23 Bankr. 563 (Bankr. E.D. Tenn. 1982) (section 17a(2) applied although individ-
ual debtor obtained money for a corporation); Harris v. Pirnie, 16 Bankr. 65 (Bankr. D.
Mass. 1981) (section 17a(2) applied where bankrupt obtained property for a trust of which
he was trustee and the "moving force"). But cf. Rudstrom v. Sheridan, 122 Minn. 262, 142
N.W. 313 (1913) (objection to dischargeability denied when debtor received no property as a
result of allegedly fraudulent representations).
129. See, e.g, First Nat'l Bank v. Mann (In re Mann), 40 Bankr. 496, 499 (Bankr. D.
Mass. 1984) (section 523(a)(2) applied to debtor who obtained money and credit for corpo-
ration of which he was president, director, and shareholder; financial benefit to debtor suf-
ficed to trigger applicability); Century First Nat'l Bank v. Holwerda (In re Holwerda), 29
Bankr. 486, 489 (Bankr. M.D. Fla. 1983) (section 523(a)(2) applied to debtor who obtained
money for corporation of which he was a "principal").
130. See supra text accompanying notes 66-67.
131. See Strang v. Bradner, 114 U.S. 555, 561 (1885); In re Lubbers, 1 BANKI CT. DEC.
(CRR) 1293, 1295 (Bankr. W.D. Mich. 1975); A. Sam & Sons Produce Co. v. Campese, 14
A.D.2d 487, 487, 217 N.Y.S.2d 275, 277 (1961); Griffin v. Bergeda, 152 Tenn. 512, 516, 279
S.W. 385, 386 (1926). Although the Supreme Court in Strang noted that the innocent part-
ners "received and appropriated the fruits of the fraudulent conduct of their associate in
business," 114 U.S. at 561, the courts have generally not required a showing of ratification
or acceptance of the benefits of a partner's wrongdoing in denying dischargeability from
partnership debts.
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a nondischargeable liability for all partners."3 2
The cases insulating nonparticipating partners from the effect
of wrongful acts of their partner for the purpose of determining
the right to a discharge but not for determining dischargeability
are reconcilable in light of the different purposes and assumptions
underlying the relevant provisions. The enumeration of grounds of
objection to discharge is designed to deter acts injurious to credi-
tors and to encourage cooperation in the administration of the es-
tate. Denial of discharge because of the conduct of a person other
than the debtor would only indirectly deter misconduct and non-
cooperation and could result in harsh application of the discharge
provisions. The exceptions from dischargeability, on the other
hand, are not designed so much to affect the conduct of the bank-
rupt as they are to protect certain classes of creditors from loss of
their just claims even as against an honest, deserving, but finan-
cially distressed debtor. In this light the cases relieving an inno-
cent partner from the consequences of another partner's misdeeds
when seeking a discharge from all nonexcepted debts but making
his nonparticipation irrelevant when a creditor seeks collection of
an excepted debt can at least be rationalized.
Administrative expense claims are not dischargeable, but they
are generally not enforceable against a debtor because the obligor
is the estate rather than the debtor whose estate is being adminis-
tered. 3 A recent state court nonetheless took the extraordinary
132. See McIntyre v. Kavanaugh, 242 U.S. 138 (1916); cf. G.F.C. Credit Corp. v. Han-
kins (In re Hankins), 2 BANKR. CT. DEC. (CRR) 409 (Bankr. S.D. Ala. 1976) (discharged
partners held not liable for conversion of collateral although each gave a security interest in
the same partnership asset to different lender, because such actions were not willful and
malicious).
133. See, e.g., McNulta v. Lochridge, 141 U.S. 327, 332 (1891) (judgments against eq-
uity receiver payable only from the funds in his hands); In re Mann, 4 BANKR. CT. DEC.
(CRR) 514, 515 (Bankr. S.D. Tex. 1978) (while administrative expense claimants held to be
compensable only out of estate, attorney for debtor allowed to be compensated out of
postpetition acquisitions of debtor for postpetition services to debtor in seeking discharge);
cf. Bright v. Fred C. Sproul, Inc., 616 P.2d 189 (Colo. App. 1980) (action filed in state court
by attorney to collect fee for services rendered to Chapter XI debtor in possession dismissed
for lack of jurisdiction).
In according administrative expense priority to the claims of victims of the negligence
of a Chapter XI receiver's employee, the Supreme Court cited McNulta with approval in
Reading Co. v. Brown, 391 U.S. 471 (1968), but the Court was at pains to point out that it
did not reach and did not "mean to reaffirm the implication of McNulta that an action
against the ... debtor after termination of the receivership would never lie under any cir-
cumstances." Id. at 478 n.7. A debtor was held liable for a tort inflicted during the operation
of its properties by an equity receiver in Texas & Pac. Ry. Co. v. Bloom's Adm'r, 164 U.S.
636 (1897), but the circumstances were atypical. The debtor had procured or at least acqui-
esced in the termination of the receivership without a sale of the assets, and the restoration
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step of declaring the enforceability of an administrative expense
claim incurred in a partnership case against the partners after the
close of the case.11 4 Because the partners were not debtors in the
case under Title 11, the litigation was not barred by any discharge
granted to the partnership. Enforced collection of administrative
expense claims from any obligor other than the estate or one who
has assumed the obligation, however, is not authorized by the
bankruptcy law or any legal principle.
13 5
of the assets to the debtor was deemed to be subject to an assumption by the debtor of
liability for valid, unpaid claims against the receiver. 164 U.S. at 639-41.
134. See Mt. Wheeler Power v. Gallagher, 653 P.2d 1212 (Nev. 1982). The partnership
debtor had filed a Chapter XII petition under the Bankruptcy Act, and the case had later
been converted into a straight bankruptcy case on the debtor's motion. The court held that
there had been an implied assumption of an executory contract for the delivery of electricity
by virtue of the acceptance by the debtor in possession of continued performance of the
contract. Id. at 1214. There is less basis for such an implication under §§ 365(a) and 366 of
the Bankruptcy Code, however. Although assumption gives rise to administrative expense
priority under the Code as under the Bankruptcy Act, there is no basis under either law for
treating the administrative expense obligation as nondischargeable.
When an executory contract is assumed by the debtor in possession or by the trustee,
the contract obligations to the other party become administrative expense claims entitled to
first priority under § 503(b)(1) and § 597(a)(1). Assumption converts any prepetition claim
arising out of the contract and therefore constituting only a general, nonpriority claim into
one entitled to the highest priority against the unencumbered estate. When the case is
closed, the court's order should provide for payment of all administrative expense claims out
of funds of the estate. If there are insufficient funds in the estate to defray all administra-
tive expenses, there is no basis in law for imposing liability on any surviving debtor, or on
the owners of the debtor if it is a corporation or partnership, for any unpaid administrative
expense. On the other hand, there may indeed be a contractual or equitable basis for impos-
ing liability on a surviving debtor or its owners for the value of services or goods delivered
pursuant to an assumed executory contract. Such a rationale may have underlain the court's
decision in Mt. Wheeler Power v. Gallaher. The bankruptcy of the partnership dissolved
the partnership, but the dissolution may have appeared to the court to have been an insuffi-
cient basis for relieving the former owners of liability for the value of services delivered to
and accepted and used by the firm under their management. 653 P.2d at 1214; see also
supra note 33.
135. See In re Higgins, 29 Bankr. 196, 199 n.5 (Bankr. N.D. Iowa 1983) (tax claims
said to be discharged if classifiable as an administrative expense); In re Western Farmers
Ass'n, 13 Bankr. 132 (Bankr. W.D. Wash. 1981) (administrative expense claims acknowl-
edged to be worthless if the estate would not be sufficient to pay them). An unpaid adminis-
trative expense claimant was nonetheless held free to proceed against a discharged individ-
ual bankrupt in Birmingham Elec. Battery Co. v. Elmer's Auto Parts (In re Elmer's Auto
Parts), 34 Bankr. 63 (Bankr. N.D. Ala. 1983). As in the Mt. Wheeler Power case cited in
supra note 134, the administrative expense had been incurred by a debtor in possession
during an aborted reorganization effort. In neither case was authority cited for allowing re-
covery of administrative expenses from a source of payment other than the estate.
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IV, DISCHARGE OF A LIMITED PARTNERSHIP OR A LIMITED PARTNER
AND DISCHARGEABILITY OF THE PARTNERSHIP'S
OR THE PARTNER'S DEBTS
The discharge of a limited partnership and the dis-
chargeability of debts owed by it requires considerations no differ-
ent than those applicable to any other partnership or, indeed, to
most other types of debtors. The discharge of a limited partner
and the dischargeability of the debts of such a partner raise few
special problems. The liability of such a partner for his contribu-
tion to the partnership estate is likely to be dischargeable under
section 523, and the limited partner's relationship to the firm, its
creditors, and his nonpartnership creditors does not seem to gener-
ate any difficulties, particular or generic. If a limited partner is a
debtor, either a general partner or a relative of a general partner
may be an insider of the debtor, and, in such a case, the perplexing
problems presented by section 727(a)(7)186 may arise. Thus, if a
limited partner who is a debtor was guilty of any of the acts speci-
fied in section 727(a)(2), (3), (4), (5), or (6) in connection with a
case concerning such an insider, the limited partner may be denied
a discharge.
A limited partner is not an insider of the partnership or of any
of the other partners, either general or limited, and accordingly the
interpretive problems concerning section 727(a)(7) do not ordina-
rily arise in a case of a partnership with which the limited partner
is associated or any of the partners in that partnership.
V. CONCLUSION
The rules governing the discharge of partnerships and part-
ners and the dischargeability of debts owed by them are for the
most part straightforward and are consonant with the rules appli-
cable to other types of debtors. The discharge of partnership is
treated in much the same way as the discharge of a corporation: an
entity of neither type is discharged in a liquidation case under
Chapter 7, but an entity of either type may obtain a comprehen-
sive discharge in a case under Chapter 11.
An individual partner's ability to obtain a discharge and the
dischargeability of his debts are generally governed by the same
rules that apply to other individuals. The effect of a discharge of a
general partner and the dischamgeability of his debts are generally
136. See supra notes 68-91 and accompanying text.
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subject to the same rules with respect to debts owed to partnership
creditors as apply to his nonpartnership debts. Perplexing inter-
pretive problems arise under section 727(a)(7), however, when a
debtor who is a partner has committed an act that constitutes a
ground of objection to discharge in connection with a case concern-
ing an insider. An insider may be the partnership of which the
debtor is a member, a copartner of the debtor, or a relative of a
copartner. Whether section 727(a)(7) will serve its intended pur-
pose will depend to a considerable extent on courts' willingness to
construe the provision's language in light of stated legislative pur-
pose and prior judicial interpretations of even less apt language in
the Bankruptcy Act.
The acts of a debtor's copartner are generally not attributed to
the debtor so as to deprive the latter of the benefit of a discharge
unless the debtor participated in or ratified the copartner's act.
When the question is the dischargeability of a partnership debt
owed by a partner, however, the courts are more prone to hold the
partnership debt to be a nondischargeable obligation of each part-
ner/debtor, notwithstanding the partner's protestations of lack of
involvement in the circumstances giving rise to the nondis-
chargeability of the debt.
Ordinarily a partner does not and cannot obtain a discharge
from either a partnership or a nonpartnership debt unless an order
for relief has been entered on behalf of or against the partner, even
though the trustee of the partnership draws the partner's property
into the estate of the partnership and administers it for the benefit
of the partnership's creditors. Nonetheless, there is authority sus-
taining the discharge of a partner pursuant to a provision of an
order confirming a partnership plan when the creditor, having no-
tice and an opportunity to object to the discharge provision, failed
to avail himself of the opportunity.
Finally, the discharge and dischargeability of limited partner-
ships' and limited partners' liabilities give rise to no special issues.
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